New Party Entries and Dramatic Moves along the Left-Right Spectrum : Party Competition in Bulgaria and Romania during the 2000s

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Electoral success by new parties has become the new norm in Central and Eastern Europe. In Bulgaria (2001, 2009), Latvia (2002), Estonia (2003), and Lithuania (2004), genuinely new parties have gained control of the government. Although new parties have not had comparable success in other countries in the region, such as Romania and Hungary, both these nations have seen established parties (e.g., the Democratic Party in Romania and Fidesz in Hungary) undergo major ideological shifts. These phenomena have been often attributed to weak institutionalization and immaturity of party systems (Mainwaring and Torcal 2006 ; Mair 1997 ; Kitschelt, Mansfeldova, Markowski and Tőka 1999). On the other hand, 25 years after the fall of communism, it is becoming difficult to contend that party system institutionalization in post-communist Europe will follow a similar trajectory and reach a level of institutionalization comparable to that in Western Europe.[(1)] Thus, it seems at least reasonable to consider the party systems existing in Central and Eastern Europe as distinctive types rather than as transitory or immature.

From this standpoint, the cases of Romania and Bulgaria deserve special consideration. Both countries are young democracies with a

communist past and have often been classified as reflecting the same type of post-communist party politics (Grzymała-Busse 2006 ; Kuzio 2008 ; Vachudova 2008). However, the evolution of party competition structure in these two nations followed contrasting patterns in the 2000s. Romania appears to have moved toward a more stable structure of party competition, although it also witnessed the dramatic ideological reorientation of an established party. On the other hand, the stability of Bulgaria's party system has decreased dramatically due to the repeated and large-scale success of new parties. These contrasting developments raise a series of interesting questions not only about the stability of party systems in these two countries but also more broadly about the nature of party politics in post-communist democracies. This paper seeks to address these questions through a comparative examination of the evolution of the Romanian and Bulgarian party systems.

The paper is structured as follows. The first section traces the development of the party systems in Bulgaria and Romania since the collapse of communism and highlights the divergent development of party competition structures in the 2000s. The second section looks at why contrasting patterns emerged in the two countries during the 2000s, examining institutional factors, the dynamics of party competition, and the distribution of voter preferences. The final section summarizes the main findings, provides interpretations, and considers theoretical implications.

1. The Development of Party Systems and Party Competition in Romania and Bulgaria

1) The Formation of Party Systems in the 1990s

The starting point for party system formation in both Romania and Bulgaria was regime change in 1989. The mode of transition to democracy in these two nations differed from that in other East Central European countries. Communist rule in both countries was characterized by lack of experience with political and economic reforms and by the absence of dissident and opposition movements. As a result, the trigger of change was an intra-party coup (accompanied by a popular uprising in Romania) that displaced the discredited top leadership while the former communist elites successfully controlled the transition process. Therefore, the successors of the Communist party in both countries—the National Salvation Front (FSN) in Romania and the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP)—scheduled and won the first democratic elections in spring 1990, due to the organizational assets they had inherited from the communist regime, along with the political weakness and inexperience of alternative non-communist elites.

As a result, post-communist Romania and Bulgaria saw the development of a party system unlike those in East Central European countries (known also as the Visegrád group) where democratic consolidation was achieved during the early post-communist period. However, in spite of several setbacks and stagnation, democracy became "the only game in town" (Linz and Stepan 1996 : 5) in Romania and Bulgaria by the mid-1990s. Furthermore, these countries passed the "turnover test" (Huntington 1991) as presidential and governmental power was peacefully trans-

ferred to the opposition after the successors to the Communist Party were defeated in subsequent elections.

Thus, the following commonalities can be observed with regard to the party systems of Romania and Bulgaria in the 1990s. First, as noted above, the communist successor parties controlled the transition and won the first free elections. Second, the anti-communist opposition gradually united in a large coalition of small parties (the Romanian Democratic Convention [CDR] and the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] in Bulgaria) to form the main opposition camp, although it remained poorly organized and torn by internal conflict and lacked a unified vision. Third, beginning in the mid-1990s, the electoral politics in both countries displayed a similar pattern, marked by the repeated defeat of incumbents and an alternation of power between more or less reformed communist successor parties and the "democratic" center-right opposition. Fourth, parties representing ethnic minorities have formed, such as the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR) and the ethnic Turk's Movement for Rights and Freedom (DPS) in Bulgaria. These are center-oriented parties with their own highly stable constituency, and they play a pivotal role in coalition bargaining ; therefore, they have participated in several governing coalitions in the post-communist years. Fifth, "regime divide" between communist successors and the opposition or anti-communist camp has determined not only electoral competition but also coalition formation.

2) Change in the 2000s : Stabilization or Destabilization of the Party System

Although the party systems of Romania and Bulgaria showed similarities in the 1990s, contrasting patterns of evolution emerged in the 2000s.

In Romania, the communist successor party, the Democratic National Salvation Front (FDSN), changed its name first to the Party of Social Democracy in Romania (PDSR) in 1993 and then to the Social Democratic Party (PSD) in 2001. Moreover, it changed its ideological orientation to social-democratic (although less reformed elements may have maintained influence within the party as well [Fesnic 2015]). On the other hand, the Democratic Party (PD), which also had institutional roots in the former Communist Party, was more fluid ideologically, converting from social democracy in the 1990s to a right-of-center orientation in the 2000s. As a result, five major parties——the PSD on the center-left, the PD (known as the Democratic Liberal Party or PDL since 2007) and the National Liberal Party (PNL) on the center-right, the ethnic Hungarian UDMR, and the radical nationalist Greater Romania Party (PRM)[2]——have established their positions to some extent (Appendices 1, 2, 3, and 4. Here after "A-1, A-2...")[3].

On the other hand, in Bulgaria the BSP has kept its relatively stable position on the center-left, whereas center-right parties have retained a high level of fragmentation connected with the successful entry of powerful new parties such as the National Movement Simeon II (NDSV) in 2001 and Citizens for the European Development of Bulgaria (GERB) in 2009, both of which nearly won a majority of seats in parliament and took the lead in the government. Thus, the Bulgarian party system appears unstable and fluid (A-5 and A-6).

The aforementioned features of the party systems in both countries can be quantified by means of three criteria that are widely used to measure the stabilization of party systems : the effective number of parliamentary parties (ENPP), electoral volatility, and the average age of parties in parliament (e.g., Jurek 2010)[4].

Figure 1 : ENPP in Romania & Bulgaria (5)



Figure 1 graphically depicts the ENPP in Romania and Bulgaria.(6) In Romania, the ENPP rose sharply in the 1992 elections as the result of the FSN's split into two factions : the FSN/PD and the Democratic National Salvation Front (FDSN). In addition, since the small center-right parties continued to win seats as part of an electoral coalition, the ENPP remained relatively high through the 1990s. However, it followed a decreasing trend after the 2000 elections. In Bulgaria, the ENPP was relatively low (consistently 2.5) in the 1990s as the natural result of the stable party system, comprising two major parties——the BSP and the SDS——as well as a relatively small party with a stable electorate, the DPS. However, the ENPP has shown an increasing trend since the 2000 elections.

Electoral volatility trends over time (Figure 2) also reveal contrasting patterns between the two countries. Romania displayed higher levels of volatility until the 2000 elections, but since then its volatility level has

Figure 2 : Electoral Volatility in Romania & Bulgaria



remained below 20%. On the contrary, Bulgaria reached its highest volatility in the 2001 elections and has maintained higher levels of volatility since then (30%), with the exception of the snap elections of 2013 (20.2%).

Similarly, the average age of parliamentary parties highlights the contrast between the two countries. Only parties obtaining at least one mandate as of 2010 are included in the calculation here. In Romania, all political parties represented in the 2010 parliament have been functioning in parliament at least since the 1992 elections (with an average age of 18.5 years). On the contrary, more than half the seats in Bulgaria's parliament were occupied by new parties founded in the late 2000s ; the average age is 11.2 years.

As for coalition politics, the "regime divide" between communist successors and anti-communists gradually weakened in both countries (Fesnic 2011 ; Todorov 2007). As all parties became potentially "coalition-

able," the patterns of coalition building have become less predictable.

In sum, political parties in general have remained relatively stable since the early 1990s in Romania. Moreover, competition for control of the government seems to have become the exclusive sphere of the same sets of political parties. Thus, Romania appears to reflect some progress toward a more stable structure of competition (Gherghina 2011 ; King and Marian 2011). Conversely, the level of institutionalization of the Bulgarian party system has declined dramatically in the 2000s. In the next section, we consider why these contrasting patterns have developed.

2. Why Did Contrasting Patterns of Party System Development Emerge in the 2000s?

1) Institutional Factors : The Cost or Benefit of Political Newcomers

The institutional framework, including the party registration and party financing systems and the electoral system, affects the incentive structure for new parties to emerge (Tavits 2006). If the barriers for entering the political arena are high, the supply of new parties competing in elections will be reduced. Conversely, a system with low barriers would encourage political newcomers to launch a new party and enter an election.

First, we focus on the legal frameworks within which parties function. The requirements for establishing political parties in Romania have been more restrictive than those in Bulgaria (Carp 2015). Party law in Romania required a list of 25,000 founding members, residing in at least 18 counties (județele) and the Municipality of Bucharest (but no less than 700 persons for each of these counties and Bucharest) for a party to be officially registered (Legea nr. 14 din 2003). In Bulgaria, the requirements

for party registration were stiffened in 2005, but they still require only 5,000 members (Savkova 2005 ; Spirova 2007b). Furthermore, state party subsidies strongly favor parliamentary parties over extra-parliamentary competitors in Romania (Gherghina, Chiru and Casal-Bértoa 2011). In Bulgaria, on the other hand, state party subsidies are allocated to all parties that received at least 1% of all valid votes in the previous parliamentary election (Spirova 2007a).

As for electoral systems, parliamentary elections in Bulgaria have been held using a proportional representation (PR) system with a closed party list since 1991 (the one exception was the 2009 elections, which used a mixed electoral system with a dominant PR system and a small single-member district [SMD] component). Similarly, elections for the two chambers of Romania's parliament had used a closed party list PR system since 1990, but Romania changed to a single-ballot mixed electoral system in 2008. In this system, voters cast a single ballot in SMDs, but the votes of a party's candidates are pooled, determining the party's share of seats in the legislature, so the final outcome is very proportional. More important differences between the two countries involve the electoral threshold. In Romania, the electoral threshold rose from 0% in 1990 to 3% in 1992 and 1996 and then to 5% since 2000. Furthermore, for electoral alliances, the electoral threshold is raised to 8% if there are two parties in the alliance, and another 1% is added, for the third and fourth parties, up to a maximum of 10%. On the other hand, the threshold for both political parties and coalitions is 4% in Bulgaria.

These data on institutional obstacles indicate that the entry of new parties seems easier in Bulgaria than in Romania. The difference in the electoral threshold for coalitions is particularly important. In Romania, fragmentation in parliament was reduced somewhat by the raising of the

threshold, which facilitated the regrouping and unification of the center-right parties. In contrast, the small center-right parties continue to win seats as part of an electoral coalition in Bulgaria, thanks to the rather low threshold for coalitions.

However, the above-mentioned factors do not appear very important in explaining the emergence and electoral success of the NDSV and the GERB in Bulgaria. Despite being created only shortly before the elections, both of these parties won a significant percentage of the vote (42.7% and 39.7%, respectively) and came to power. Both parties aimed intentionally at achieving immediate and large-scale success. Thus, it would seem that the configurations of the existing parties and the prevailing patterns of party competition were more relevant to their goals and performance than were the above-mentioned factors. Next, we analyze these two factors in both Romania and Bulgaria.

2) Dynamics of Party Competition

2-1) Empty space in party competition?

In this section, we consider the immediate and large-scale success of new parties as in Bulgaria during the 2000s from the perspective of the spatial model of party competition. Generally speaking, the presence of empty space in party competition and of a relatively dense distribution of voter preferences within that space will facilitate the emergence and success of new parties. From this point of view, how could we characterize the political space in Romania and Bulgaria in the early 2000s? In both countries, the communist successor parties established a substantial degree of dominance on the left. Therefore, we focus on the (center-) right.

The 2000 elections in Romania seem to have offered a relatively

favorable environment for center-right alternatives, because the Christian Democratic National Peasants Party (PNȚCD), the largest center-right party in the 1990s, failed to reach the electoral threshold and lost its parliamentary representation (A-2). This sudden decline was a consequence of widespread popular disappointment with the severe economic downturn that occurred during the PNȚCD-led government, its inefficient governmental performance, and coalition infighting. Moreover, the PNȚCD also suffered a significant defection by its members ; by late 2000, half of all MPs representing the PNȚCD had left the party (Stan 2005). On the other hand, from the perspective of voter preferences, the distribution of self-placement of all voters steadily shifted rightward throughout the 2000s (A-7, A-8, A-9, and A-10). In these respects, there seems to have been a political opportunity for center-right alternatives in Romania in the early 2000s.

On the contrary, in the Bulgarian case there seems to have been no empty space on the center-right, as until just before the 2001 elections the SDS occupied the center-right political space. Similarly, in the late 2000s the center-right of the political spectrum was densely populated by (albeit divided among) the NDSV, the SDS, Democrats for Strong Bulgaria (DSB, a breakoff from the SDS), and others (A-6). Therefore, it appears that rather strong parties occupied the center-right portion of the spectrum throughout the 2000s and preempted the success of other parties. In addition, from the perspective of voter preferences, the distribution of self-placement of all voters gradually shifted rightward (A-11 and A-12), but not so much as in Romania (A-8).

Thus, if we focus on the presence of empty space in party competition, we would expect new parties to have greater chances of success in Romania than in Bulgaria, yet the opposite has prevailed. To solve this

puzzle, we will take a closer look at the makeup and character of the main center-right parties as well as the dynamics of party competition in both countries.

2-2) Dramatic position change and unification : The case of Romania

2-2-1) A dramatic move on the left-right Spectrum

The reason why the empty space on the center-right was not occupied by new parties in Romania during the 2000s is that an existing party, the PD, made a significant shift from a center-left position in the 1990s to a center-right position in the early 2000s. In this way, it successfully filled the void left behind by the PNȚCD's decline. The PD also switched its affiliation within Europarties from the Party of European Socialists (PES) to the European People's Party (EPP). Of particular interest here is why this apparently opportunistic reorientation has carried minimal electoral cost, enabling the PD to enjoy greater electoral success.

The PD originated from the FSN, the unofficial communist successor party. Thereafter, a growing conflict between President Ion Iliescu and Prime Minister Petre Roman eventually split the FSN in March 1992. The Roman faction advocated relatively rapid economic reforms and initially retained the name FSN, which it later changed to PD. On the other hand, the Iliescu faction favored more a gradual approach to economic transition and adopted the name FDSN. Thus, from the point of view of institutional and personnel continuity, the PD arguably qualifies as a communist successor party (Pop-Eleches 2008). On the policy and ideological dimension, however, it moved gradually toward the center during the mid-1990s (A-1). The PD espoused a market-embracing, social-democratic approach and abandoned the use of nationalism, whereas

Iliescu's FDSN/PDSR continued the use of opportunist nationalism while leading the government from 1992 to 1996 (Maxfield 2008). As for coalition politics, the PD's ideological flexibility and pragmatism paved the way for governing coalitions with anti-communist reformers (such as the CDR government from 1996 to 2000).

In short, the PD had key features similar to those of former "reform Communists" or communist successor parties in Poland and Hungary (Grzymała-Busse 2002), including skilled, pragmatic elites with administrative experience and managerial competence and relatively strong organizational discipline. Moreover, the PD had generally positioned itself somewhat to the right of the communist successor PDSR/PSD throughout the 1990s (Gherghina 2011 : 34). Taking these factors (and the PSD's move to the center-left) into consideration, we can see the PD's apparently surprising shift as fitting into an evolutionary pattern that has been consistent since the party's establishment (Maxfield 2008). In addition, the PD was fortunate to be in possession of a capable and adaptable leader who took radical action to re-launch the party, namely Traian Băsescu. He was elected as mayor of Bucharest in spring 2000 and strongly pushed forward the unification of the center-right parties, as discussed below.

2-2-2) Toward a unification of the center-right

The vacant space on the center-right was filled by the PD. Furthermore, efforts to unify the center-right made substantial progress around the same time. These efforts began immediately after the 2000 elections, which brought a crushing defeat of the center-right. Only the PD and PNL were left with the credibility of parliamentary representation, and their support was roughly evenly split. In this respect, reunification of the

PNL was important, along with the aforementioned transformation of the PD.

The PNL had been the largest party from the late 19th century through the interwar period and was reestablished in the days of the 1989 revolution. Although the PNL received the third largest share of votes (6.41%) in the founding elections, it faced an extended period of internal conflict and split in the 1990s. However, the liberal family began to regroup in 1998 by absorbing the Civic Alliance Party and the Liberal Party. This liberal reunification was completed with the absorption of PNL-Câmpeanu in 2003 (Radu 2009 ; Stoica 2010).

As a result, two parties that were clearly different in their origin and profile consolidated their position on the center-right. The aforementioned cooperation project between the PD and PNL culminated in the creation of the Truth and Justice Alliance (ADA) in September 2003. The ADA proposed a center-right platform, emphasizing the promotion of free-market initiatives such as the introduction of a 16% flat tax. Its popular presidential candidate, Băsescu, won a dramatic runoff victory and appointed as prime minister the leader of the PNL (Călin Popescu-Tăriceanu) rather than the leader of the PSD, which had won the legislative elections.

However, within months, tensions between Băsescu and Popescu-Tăriceanu began to appear, leading to an open and irreconcilable conflict by early 2007 (Marian and King 2011). Moreover, the PD's relations with the PNL also deteriorated, and the PD finally left the coalition government in March 2007. Although the ADA collapsed, the PD merged with the Liberal Democratic Party (a splinter group from the PNL) to form the PDL. Furthermore, the PDL rode the coattails of President Băsescu's popularity to become the most powerful party by the 2008 elections.

2-3) The case of Bulgaria

2-3-1) The project of newness

Why have successful new parties repeatedly emerged in Bulgaria even though there seems to have been no vacant space on the center-right? How can we explain this phenomenon? Basically, it is not necessarily difficult for political newcomers to fight in an already-occupied ideological territory (at least in new democracies). In fact, many similar instances of this phenomenon occurred in Central and Eastern European countries around the same time.

Here, we reexamine this phenomenon from the perspective of voters' preference (the "demand side"). For this purpose, we employ the Canonical Discriminant Analysis (CDA)[7]. CDA is a statistical techniques used to estimate canonical discriminant functions (CDFs), which describe separations between groups based on linear composites (discriminant variables) of the outcome variables. In this study, we use party preference or party choice in elections as outcome variables ; for discriminant variables candidates, we use political issues, political ideology and demographic attributes. The CDFs and discriminant variables may define the issue dimensions of the party systems. After estimating the CDFs, we can calculate "classification accuracy," indicating how far CDFs properly discriminate between the data. We identify them as an indicator of differentiation between the groups that support the parties. The higher classification accuracy belongs to a party that has more distinctive supporters.

For the 2001 elections, the CDA suggests that the classification accuracy of NDSV was relatively low at 46.47% (A-15). It seems that discrimination between NDSV, G-V (right), and SDS (center-right) was not easy. Similarly, for the 2009 elections, the CDA suggests that the

classification accuracy of GERB was as low as 31.61% (A-18). It was difficult to distinguish between voters for GERB, those for SDS-DSB, and those for Ataka (a radical right party). These results indicate that both NDSV and GERB fought on already-occupied territory (i.e., the center-right).

Sikk (2012) offers a general account of the emergence of new parties. His typology can be represented along two dimensions : whether a new party has a strong ideological motivation and whether it occupies a niche captured by an established party.[8] Previous studies (Lucardie 2000) of new parties have focused on the following three types : (1) "prophets," that advocate a new ideology ; (2) "prolocutors," who are not linked to ideologies but address a single issue or interest disregarded by established actors ; and (3) "purifiers," who aim to salvage an ideology represented only poorly by established parties. In addition, Sikk proposed a fourth, alternative category—"the project of newness." Parties falling in this category have a broad set of policies similar to those of established parties ; lacking a particularly strong ideological motivation, they seek to change primarily the manner of doing politics rather than its contents (Sikk 2012 : 467). This type of new party, whose newness itself was their most appealing feature, swept over the Baltic states. Sikk's description appears to fit the NDSV and GERB in Bulgaria as well.

Important factors contributing to the success of these new parties included voters' frustration and disappointment with established parties due to rampant corruption, as well as the reputation and personal charisma of new party leaders : ex-king Simeon II in the NDSV and a tough police chief, Borisov, in the GERB (Barany 2002 ; Savkova 2009). However, we also need to consider the dynamics of party competition in the political space to gain insight into the entry timing and the degree of

success of new parties.

2-3-2) Fragmentation on the center-right

A major blow to the stability of party systems in Bulgaria was delivered in the 2001 elections when the NDSV's entry shattered the previous bipolar model, characterized by a communist successor left (BSP) and an anti-communist center-right (SDS). This change also meant that center-right government continued for two consecutive terms even though the ruling party was replaced. Why did a turnover of power from the center-right to a center-left coalition not occur in 2001?

The reason is that the center-left BSP was weakened decisively (the distribution of self-placement of all voters in A-11 also suggests this). As mentioned above, the BSP dominated the political processes in Bulgaria during the early and mid-1990s. However, in 1996—1997, deepening macroeconomic imbalances provoked banking and fiscal crises and a collapse of the currency, all of which gave rise to hyperinflation. This multifaceted economic crisis led to mass protests and the end of the BSP government of Zhan Videnov. As a result, the BSP became highly discredited as a governing party and experienced a major crisis of legitimacy (Spirova 2008). Since the BSP had not yet recovered from this fiasco, it was not yet positioned to return to power in the 2001 elections. This party competition environment provided an increased incentive for center-right alternatives to emerge.

Furthermore, the weakening of the BSP in the medium term also weakened the center-right's incentive to cohere. By contrast, in Romania the leftist party endured as the dominant force throughout the first decade and a half of the post-communist period, so the rightist parties needed to regroup and become united. Since similar conditions did not

prevail in Bulgaria, the center-right remained fragmented. Therefore, another successful new party (the GERB) could arise in 2009.

3. Conclusion

This paper has analyzed the contrasting developments of party competition structure in Romania and Bulgaria during the 2000s. In the early 2000s, the center-right political space was vacant in Romania and fragmented in Bulgaria. In Romania, the established party (the PD) successfully occupied this space by shifting from a center-left to a center-right orientation. In Bulgaria, strong new parties (the NDSV in 2001 and the GERB in 2009) entered this space in succession and filled it temporarily.

Given the chronic corruption scandals and the extremely low levels of trust in existing political parties and politicians in Romania and Bulgaria,[9] the ground seems fertile for the emergence and success of new parties, which use their novelty as an asset (Hanley and Sikk 2016). From this point of view, rather, it may be natural to ask why Romania did not experience any successful new parties in the 2000s.

To answer this question, we should consider the role of President Traian Băsescu and his PDL because Băsescu carried out a project of newness in Romania within an established party. During the 2004 election campaign, Băsescu attacked the corrupt political elite and the oligarchs (real or imagined) and linked this to anti-left (i.e., anti-PSD) themes. Furthermore, after Băsescu assumed office, he accused the Parliament of being controlled by corrupt interest groups and repeatedly criticized the actions and programs of his prime minister and of the government (Marian and King 2011 ; Jiglău 2010 ; Suciu 2006). In this way, Băsescu's

leadership style caused intense partisan and personal conflicts. However, as long as the fusion of themes around modernization and anti-corruption matched public concern and Băsescu was best identified with the demand for change, he maintained popularity and high approval ratings. Only after his popularity fell dramatically due to the austerity measures he imposed in 2010 could a successful populist party, the People's Party—Dan Diaconescu (PPDD), emerge.

In this sense, there is no reason to assume that empty spaces of party competition will always be occupied by new parties. That depends largely on the strategies of political elites, or the "supply side" of the party system.

Finally, it is worthwhile to consider briefly the theoretical implications of the present discussion for our understanding of the emergence and success of new parties and post-communist politics.

First, the communist successor parties have probably had greater influence on other parties' behavior and patterns of party competition in Romania and Bulgaria than similar parties in the East Central European countries. This is because the communist successor parties in both countries (the FSN/PSD and BSP) have been the most powerful and stable forces for most of the post-communist period. As a result, other parties have been forced to choose their ideological position or even their party identity based on the positioning of communist successor parties. Furthermore, the cohesion of right-wing political formations has depended to a large extent on the strength of left-leaning communist successor parties.

Second, in relation to this, although "regime divide" has relatively weakened than in the 1990s, party competition in Romanian and Bulgaria still appears to be structured to a considerable extent in terms of each party's distance from communism or the communist past. Similarly, it

seems that the self-placement of voters on the left-right scale may still significantly depend on "regime divide." To be more precise, that divide remains strong for leftist voters and also affects rightist voters to the extent that they do not vote for the communist successor parties. To what extent this cleavage has affected political behavior among both political elites and voters (as well as non-voters) remains an important question for future research.

Third, how can we interpret the repeated emergence of successful new parties or the ideological U-turn of an established party from the perspective of accountability and party−voter linkages? On one hand, it can be argued that the aforementioned center-right parties were highly responsive to shifts in voter preferences and effectively chose positions close to as many voters as possible in order to achieve electoral success. On the other hand, short-lived new parties or drastic position changes by existing parties may hinder clear ex-post accountability or lasting party−voter linkages (especially programmatic party−voter linkages). Furthermore, these phenomena would highlight the importance of the organizational continuity and endurance of parties per se. Thus, we should focus more on the internal workings of the political parties to understand these developments more fully.

Notes

(1) Furthermore, "post-communist party systems" seems to be a rather heterogeneous category.

(2) The PRM reached a peak of popular support in the 2000 presidential and parliamentary elections ; however, in 2008 and 2012 the party failed to win any seats in parliament.

(3) We do not include the Conservative Party (the Romanian Humanist

Party until 2005) in the following analyses because it is a small party that always ran in general elections in an alliance with the Social-Democrats.

(4) Although the Romanian Parliament has two chambers, for simplicity, we account only for the results obtained by parties in the elections for the Chamber of Deputies. There were no relevant situations in which parties obtained different electoral results in the two chambers.

(5) The data used in Figures 1 and 2 come from the Election Database in Central and Eastern Europe and Former Soviet Union countries, which is published on the website of the Slavic Research Center at Hokkaido University (http://src-h.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/election_europe/index.html.).

(6) As for Bulgaria, electoral alliances or coalitions are calculated as homogeneous parties since major parties always form alliances or coalitions and one party is usually predominant within each such entity. As for Romania, along with this consideration, the ENPP is calculated based on the share of seats won by each constituent party in the case of electoral alliances or coalitions.

(7) Canonical Discriminant Analysis (CDA) is a kind of multivariate statistical technique used to estimate canonical discriminant functions (CDFs), which describe separation among groups based on some linear composites (discriminant variables) of outcome variables. CDA may also properly classify cases into the groups and provide the absolute and relative magnitude of different discriminant variables. The Degree of Classification Accuracy is shown in the Classification Table. In this study, we assume that the CDFs and the discriminant variables may define the issue dimensions of the party systems. Each data case is a point on a scale of these dimensions and has composite canonical scores

on the scales, defined as CDFs. A particular group (possibly supporters of a party) is represented by a swarm of points concentrated at a particular position on a particular scale. To summarize the position of a group, we can compute a group mean (the "centroid"). We may plot centroids on the scales and interpret the character of the party systems based on the order of the centroids and the distance between them. For technical details, see Klecka (1980) and Huberty (2010). For examples of the application to comparative politics, see Knutsen (1989) and Nakada-Amiya and Narihiro (2015).

(8) Sikk's typology of new parties is based on Lucardie (2000).

(9) Since their entrance into the European Union, Romania and Bulgaria have been subject to the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM) in order to monitor and ensure the continuation of reforms in their judicial systems and in fighting corruption and organized crime.

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<Political Parties and Electoral Alliances in Bulgaria>

Ataka : Natsionalen Sayuz "Ataka" (National Union Attack)

BSP : Bulgarska Socialisticheska Partiya (Bulgarian Socialist Party)

DPS : Dvizehnie za Prava i Svobodi (Movement for Rights and Freedoms)

DSB : Demokrati za Silna Bulgaria (Democrats for a Strong Bulgaria)

GERB : Grazhdani za Evropeisko Razvitie na Bulgaria (Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria)

G-V : Dvizhenie Gergyovden－VMRO (George's Day Movement－IMRO)

NDSV : Natsionalno Dvizhenie Simeon Vtori (National Movement Simeon the Second)

SDS : Sayuz na Demokratichnite Sili (Union of Democratic Forces)

＜Political Parties and Electoral Alliances in Romania＞

ADA : Alianța Dreptate și Adevăr (Truth and Justice Alliance)

CDR : Convenția Democratică din România (Romanian Democratic Convention)

FDSN : Frontul Democrat al Salvării Naționale (Democratic National Salvation Front)

FSN : Frontul Salvării Naționale (National Salvation Front)

PD : Partidul Democrat (Democratic Party)

PDL : Partidul Democrat Liberal (Democratic Liberal Party)

PDSR : Partidul Democrației Sociale din România (Party of Social Democracy in Romania)

PNL : Partidul Național Liberal (National Liberal Party)

PNȚCD : Partidul Național Țărănesc Creștin Democrat (Christian Democratic National Pesants' Party)

PPDD : Partidul Poporului - Dan Diaconescu (People's Party - Dan Diaconescu)

PRM : Partidul România Mare (Greater Romania Party)

PSD : Partidul Social Democrat (Social Democratic Party)

UDMR : Uniunea Democrată Maghiară din România (Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania)

Appendix: Data and Software

- Countries: Romania and Bulgaria
- Data: Comparative Study of Electoral Systems(CSES) 1, 2, 3, European Election Studies(EES) 2004, 2009 and European Values Survey(EVS)/World Values Survey(WVS) 1999/2000
- Single Dimensional Party Competition by Left-Right placement
- Statistical Software used: Stata 13 SE
- Multi-Dimensional Party Competition Structure estimated using Canonical Discriminant Analysis

Appendix 1. 1996 Romanian Parliamentary Election: Party Position on Left–Right Ideological Scale and Party Size (share of seats in parliament)

PRM have some seats but is not plotted in this graph, because the question about the party's position the respondents locate on left right ideological scale Is not included..



Appendix 2. 2000 Romanian Parliamentary Election: Party Position on Left–Right Ideological Scale and Party Size (share of seats in parliament)

Positions of Parties are calculated from mean of the self-location of supporters of each party who reveals voting intention. Note that variance of respondents' self-location is so large that the standard error of the mean position is rather large, too.



Appendix 3. 2004 Romanian Parliamentary Election: Party Position on L–R ideological scale and Party Size (share of seats in parliament)

Party size is calculated from share of seats, because vote share of individual parties within electoral coalition are not revealed.



Appendix 4. Romanian 2008 parliamentary election : Party Position on Left–Right Ideological Scale and Party Size (share of votes)



Appendix 5. Bulgarian 2001 parliamentary election : Party Position on L–R ideological scale and Party Size (share of votes)



Appendix 6. Bulgarian 2009 Parliamentary Election : Party Position on Left-Right Ideological Scale(calculated from EES 2009 data) and Party Size (share of votes in 2009 election results)



Appendix 7. Left-Right Ideological Distribution of Self-Locations of All Voters and Supporters of Each Party (Romania 1999)



Appendix 8. Ideological Distribution of voters (Romania 2005; solid line: Bulgaria 2006: dashed line)



Appendix 9. L–R Ideological Distribution of Self Location of All Voters and Party Supporters (Romania 2008)



Appendix 10. L-R Ideological Distribution of Self-Location of All Voters and Party Supporters(who vote The Presidential Candidate from Each Party in Presidential Election)(Romania 2009)



Appendix 11. L-R Ideological Distribution of Self Location of All Voters and Party Supporters(Bulgaria 2001)



Appendix 12. L–R Ideological Distribution of Self Location of All Voters and Party Supporters (Bulgaria 2009)



Appendix 13. CDA: Discriminant Functions(4)(CSES 2 Bulgaria 2001, Parliamentary Election)

variables	F1	F2	F3	F4	
lr	−0.2959731	0.8573783	−0.2404014	0.1335876	L–R
age	−0.001021	−0.2588259	0.1864348	0.7670666	Elderly
education	−0.1924457	0.0931261	0.4119812	−0.6464281	high education
employment1	−0.0748694	0.1131938	−0.0950194	−0.7145794	Full–time labor
income	−0.1065095	0.1408861	0.3364118	−0.5715969	High income
denominati~5	0.6539136	0.2472758	0.0709662	0.0410068	Muslim
lang3	0.819527	0.3371396	0.1055566	0.0124654	Turkish Speaker
rural–urban	−0.1879178	0.0438313	0.3145616	−0.4427719	Rural–Urban
democracy	0.181184	−0.3944305	−0.7148394	−0.0284588	Dissatisfied with Democracy
	Muslim Turkish Speaker	L–R	Satisfied with Democracy	Elderly	
		Young	High education	Low education	
		Satisfied with Democracy	high income	Part–time	
		Turkish	Urban	Rural	

Appendix 14. Group means



Appendix 15. Classification Table(CSES 2 Bulgaria 2001, Parliamentary Election)

vote/estimated	KB	SDS	DPS	NDSV	KG(G-V)	Total
KB	115	1	2	12	7	137
	83.94	0.73	1.46	8.76	5.11	100
SDS	4	95	2	23	21	145
	2.76	65.52	1.38	15.86	14.48	100
DPS	1	1	52	8	2	64
	1.56	1.56	81.25	12.5	3.12	100
NDSV	39	85	12	237	137	510
	7.65	16.67	2.35	46.47	26.86	100
KG(G-V)	1	7	0	4	34	46
	2.17	15.22	0	8.7	73.91	100
Total	160	189	68	284	201	902
	17.74	20.95	7.54	31.49	22.28	100

Appendix 16. EES 2009 Bulgaria Discriminant Functions(3)
(response variable=Voting Intension)

q46	0.9249719	−0.2305052	−0.071548	L−R Placement
q48	0.1675277	−0.0933645	0.2819909	Economic Situation
q80	0.0469144	−0.0910057	0.035554	EU Enlargement
q84	0.081701	0.0809913	0.4275765	Democracy
gender1	0.0055146	−0.1589832	0.5497963	Male
q114	0.0840705	0.0979035	−0.4805429	Social Class
q115	0.1131699	0.1018649	−0.2154682	Rural−Urban
q118	−0.0954439	−0.0152146	0.490655	Religious−
q120	0.1812284	0.0562006	−0.0951999	Subjective Wealth
sector1	−0.0688752	−0.2561617	0.1227298	Agriculture
sector4	−0.077226	0.0420491	−0.1349855	Public Sector
religion4	0.0823536	0.328458	−0.3923291	Orthodox
religion6	−0.1527367	−0.8986975	0.0547943	Muslim

L−R	Orthodox	Dissatisfied by Democracy
	not Muslim	Male
	not Agriculture	Social Class low
		Rural
		not religious
		not Orthodox

Appendix 17. Group means



Appendix 18. Classification Accuracy(EES 2009 Bulgaria)

vote/estimated	SDS-DSB	BSP	NDSV	GERB	ATAKA	DPS	Total
SDS-DSB	25	2	3	5	5	0	40
	62.5	5	7.5	12.5	12.5	0	100
BSP	2	86	8	3	3	3	105
	1.9	81.9	7.62	2.86	2.86	2.86	100
NDSV	1	1	11	1	1	0	15
	6.67	6.67	73.33	6.67	6.67	0	100
GERB	40	2	28	49	33	3	155
	25.81	1.29	18.06	31.61	21.29	1.94	100
ATAKA	8	2	4	3	19	1	37
	21.62	5.41	10.81	8.11	51.35	2.7	100
DPS	0	0	1	0	1	8	10
	0	0	10	0	10	80	100
Total	76	93	55	61	62	15	362
	20.99	25.69	15.19	16.85	17.13	4.14	100

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