An Assessment of the Philosophical Theories of Perception and the Issues the Direct Perception Theory Needs to Address

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Takeshi Kanasugi

1. Introduction : the Ordinary Conception of Perception and the Philosophy of Perception

Philosophers have been interested in perception for a very long time. To a non-philosopher, this might seem surprising, as little is as common and pervasive in our daily lives and as obvious to us as perceptual experience, but philosophical reflection on how we commonly understand perception reveals a contradiction. It is partially for that reason that there has been such a longstanding philosophical interest in the topic.

We ordinarily understand veridical perceptual experience (I will call this 'veridical experience' hereafter) as a presentation of ordinary things and their properties, which exist independently from the experience in the public, external world, to the subject having that experience. For example, when a person veridically perceives a pink flower in their garden, we ordinarily believe that there is a pink flower in the public, external world, existing independently from the experience, and being presented to the person. And similarly, we believe that if something is presented in experience as having certain properties, then the thing perceived actually has or instantiates those properties in the public, external world. I will call this aspect of the ordinary conception of perception 'naive realism' in the following.[1]

Naive Realism：veridical experience is a presentation of ordinary things and their properties in the public, external world to the subject of the experience.

We also ordinarily think that there are non-veridical perceptual experiences (I will call these 'non-veridical experiences' hereafter), namely, illusions and hallucinations. Typical examples of illusions are the perceptual experiences in which a subject mistakes a coil of rope on the roadside for a snake, or a blue T-shirt appears purple to a subject under certain lighting conditions. An example of a hallucination could be the perceptual experience of an orange flame on my desk (due to the effect of some drug or disease) while there really is no orange flame on my desk. Furthermore, it is commonly assumed that some illusions and hallucinations are subjectively indiscriminable from corresponding veridical experiences. Supposedly, we can be deceived by illusions and hallucinations precisely for this reason. Hereafter, I will call this aspect of the ordinary conception of perception the 'indiscriminability view'.

The Indiscriminability View：there can be non-veridical experiences that are subjectively indiscriminable from corresponding veridical experiences.

When viewed separately, these two aspects of the ordinary conception of perception seem quite plausible, but some philosophical reflection reveals that they actually contradict each other under a certain premise, and therefore, that at least one of them must be rejected unless the premise is abandoned. There are two famous philosophical arguments that demonstrate this point：the 'argument from illusion' and the 'argument from hallucination'. I will call the problem of resolving this contradiction the 'problem of perception' (cf. Crane and French [2015][2]).

Much of the history of the philosophy of perception consists of attempts to develop a philosophical theory that solves this problem of perception. My own position within this continuing debate is a version of the 'direct perception theory', and it is one of my aims to present arguments in favor of that theory. However, to be able to assess philosophical theories of perception, we need methods and criteria for assessment first, but it seems to me that there is no unambiguous agreement among philosophers of perception about such methods and criteria. Therefore, my main aim in this paper is to consider *how* to assess philosophical theories of perception. Subsequently, I will attempt to

clarify the issues that need to be addressed by the direct perception theory (or theories) in view of that method (or those methods) of assessment. As achieving these aims will require quite a few pages, presenting arguments in favor of the direct perception theory itself will (mostly) have to wait for a future paper.

In the present paper, I will first briefly introduce the two arguments that demonstrate the problem of perception – that is, the argument from illusion and the argument from hallucination in section 2. After that, section 3 will discuss the aims and purposes of philosophical theories of perception, and in section 4, I will introduce a representative selection of theories of perception – including the direct perception theory, which I support myself – focusing on how they respond to the two arguments. Finally, section 5 will consider criteria for the assessment of philosophical theories of perception, and clarify the explanatory task that the direct perception theory needs to carry out.

2. The Problem of Perception : the Argument from Illusion and the Argument from Hallucination

Both the argument from illusion and the argument from hallucination consist of (roughly) two phases, the 'base case' and the 'spreading step' (Snowdon [1992]). In the base case phase it is argued that in case of non-veridical experience, even though the subject has an experience of some things and their properties that appear to be located in the public, external world, it cannot be said that there actually is anything corresponding (exactly) to those things and/or properties in the external world. In case of the aforementioned example of a hallucination of an orange flame on my desk, that experience does not imply the existence of a corresponding thing out there – it is just a hallucination, and thus, there really is no orange flame on my desk. In case of illusions the story is slightly more complicated, but in essence the same. In the example of the blue T-shirt appearing purple under certain lighting conditions, there is a thing in the public, external world corresponding to the experience, but that thing doesn't really have the properties (or a property) experienced by the subject. That is, there really is a T-shirt out there, but it is blue rather than purple. Hence, *that* T-shirt cannot be the same as what appears to the subject. Even though there is something that *more or less* corresponds to the experience, it is not the same thing, and therefore, as is the case in a hallucination, what appears to the subject in case of an illusion doesn't exist *as*

such in the public, external world. Therefore, non-veridical experiences cannot be understood as presentations of ordinary things and their properties to the subject.

The point of the spreading step is that the same can be said in case of veridical experiences. The two arguments share a premise that a veridical experience and a non-veridical experience that are subjectively indiscriminable involve the same underlying mental state. The underlying mental state of a perceptual experience is the part of the perceptual experience in which the perceptual experience consists.[3] According to naive realism, the underlying mental state of veridical experience is a presentation of ordinary things and their properties in the public, external world to the subject of the experience. As mentioned, according to the indiscriminability view, there can be illusions and hallucinations that are subjectively indiscriminable from corresponding veridical experiences. And, in the base case phase, it is confirmed that non-veridical experience actually cannot be understood as a presentation of ordinary things and their properties to the subject. This means that the underlying mental state of non-veridical experience cannot be a presentation of ordinary things and their properties. Consequently, given the above premise, veridical experience cannot be a presentation of ordinary things and their properties to the subject either.

This last conclusion is a denial of naive realism (as defined above), and thus, the two arguments show that one aspect of the ordinary conception of perception, the indiscriminability view, contradicts the other aspect, naive realism. This raises the question how this contradiction can be resolved. In the following, I will examine how the main philosophical theories of perception address this problem. The aforementioned premise, often called the 'common factor principle' needs to be spelled out more explicitly first, however, because naive realism and the indiscriminability view contradict each other only under this premise and it plays a central role in several theories' responses to the problem of perception. As mentioned, both the argument from illusion and the argument from hallucination involve the following premise：

　The Common Factor Principle：subjectively indiscriminable veridical and 　　non-veridical experiences involve the same underlying mental state.

It could be argued that this principle is a further aspect of the ordinary conception of perception, because we tend to think that if two things are

subjectively indiscriminable, then they have something intrinsic in common. However, while the aforementioned two aspects of the ordinary conception of perception are uncontroversial, there is far less agreement about this third, and one of the considerations in section 5 is concerned with precisely this point.

3. What is a Philosophical Theory of Perception?

Philosophical theories of perception try to answer the most fundamental question in the philosophy of perception : What is perceptual experience? But of course, we do not start from zero – we are not ignorant about perception before considering this question from a *philosophical* point of view. Rather, perception is one of the most basic and pervasive features of our existence.

It is often assumed that for any perceptual experience, there is something *it is like* to be in that state. This is called its 'phenomenal character'. It is also often assumed that this phenomenal character of perceptual experience is at least partly characterized by a collection of things and properties that are – at least at first sight – presented to the subject of the perceptual experience. William Fish calls such a collection of things and properties the 'presentational character' of perceptual experience ; and those properties specifically, he calls the 'presentational properties' of perceptual experience (Fish [2009] pp. 11-6). I will adopt these terms here. The phenomenal character of perceptual experience is not necessarily determined completely by the presentational character of perceptual experience – it may also be (co-) determined by the mode of perceptual experience, for example (cf. Crane [2001] chap. 5, sec. 43).[4] Nevertheless, it is undeniable that the presentational character of a perceptual experience is what distinguishes it from other mental states such as belief, and for this reason, it can be argued that the main aim of the philosophy of perception is to explain the presentational character of perceptual experience.

Philosophical theories in general try to answer the most fundamental questions about some subject matter, while assuming or taking for granted some parts or aspects of our ordinary conception of that subject matter. An example of such a fundamental question in the specific case of perception is : What *is* perceptual experience? Furthermore, philosophical theories try to consistently explain other parts or aspects of the ordinary conception of the subject matter with the help of auxiliary hypotheses. However, different parts

or aspects of the ordinary conception of some subject matter often turn out to be contradictory on closer reflection, as is the case with naive realism, the indiscriminability view, and the common factor principle in the case of perception. In such cases, one way in which philosophical theories can attempt to resolve the contradiction is by rejecting one or more of the conflicting parts or aspects.

The ordinary conception of some philosophical subject matter consists of multiple parts or aspects. The most central parts of our various ordinary conceptions (of various subjects) together constitute what might be called the 'worldview' that provides the framework for our various investigations. Wittgenstein would call this our 'picture of the world' (Wittgenstein [1969]), Quine would call it the 'center of the web of belief' (Quine [1951]), and Lakatos would call it the 'hard core of the research programme' (Lakatos [1978]). However, an ordinary conception also includes parts or aspects that have been gradually formed in our experience of the world in our daily lives, as well as by our understanding of the subject matter informed by our acquaintance with scientific knowledge. An example of the latter is the understanding that there is a correlation between mind and brain. These more peripheral parts of the ordinary conception of some subject matter are not immune to empirical refutation. We may have formed a false conception in our daily experience, for example, and be corrected by new experience or new scientific knowledge. However, the same is true of the worldview at the center of our ordinary conceptions, the 'hard core'. When some investigation arrives at a dead end (or in Lakatos' terms, when the research programme becomes extremely degenerating), the worldview that provides the framework of the investigation itself can be revised. In this way, when reflection reveals a contradiction in the ordinary conception of some subject matter, philosophical theories can attempt to resolve that contradiction by rejecting one or more parts or aspects of that ordinary conception.

4. Philosophical Theories of Perception

One may wonder which parts or aspects of the ordinary conception philosophical theories of perception reject in order to resolve the aforementioned contradiction (see section 2). In the following sub-sections, we will take a look at the main theories : the sense-datum theory, the adverbial theory, the intentional theory, and the direct perception theory.

4. 1 The Sense-Datum Theory

The sense-datum theory's solution is to reject naive realism (cf. Robinson [1994]；Foster [2000]). Then, how does this theory understand veridical experience? Because it accepts the indiscriminability view and the common factor principle, what matters is how it understands non-veridical experience.

When a subject has a hallucination of an orange flame on their desk, there isn't actually anything that corresponds to that orange flame in the public, external world (or at least not on their desk). The question, then, is why it seems to the subject that there is something orange there. According to the sense-datum theory, there must be something orange in the subject's 'inner world' instead. Such inner entities are called 'sense-data', and the presentational character of non-veridical experience is understood as a collection of sense-data and properties of sense-data. Thus, a non-veridical experience in which something appears F to the subject consists in acquaintance with a sense-datum which is actually F. This 'acquaintance' is thought to be a direct relation between the subject of the experience and the object, and is usually assumed to be a primitive relation that cannot be further reduced or explained. According to the sense-datum theory, since the common factor principle holds, the same is true of veridical experience – that is, perceptual experience (of any kind) in which something appears F to the subject consists in acquaintance with a sense-datum which is actually F. Consequently, according to this theory, naive realism is wrong.

The sense-datum theory's claim that when a subject has a hallucination of an orange flame on their desk there must be something orange in the subject's inner world follows from an assumption that is often called the 'phenomenal principle'：

The Phenomenal Principle：if something appears to the subject of a perceptual experience having some properties, then there is something the subject is aware of that instantiates those properties.

This principle is closely related to naive realism, because the latter can be thought to imply the phenomenal principle that applies to veridical experience. However, contrary to naive realism, this principle does not imply that the thing instantiating the properties as they appear to the subject is something in the public, external world. (In the contrary, according to sense-datum theory, that thing is located in the subject's inner world.) Hence, the sense-datum theory

rejects naive realism.

4. 2 The Adverbial Theory

　　Like the sense-datum theory, the adverbial theory accepts both the indiscriminability view and the common factor principle and rejects naive realism to resolve the contradiction（cf. Chisholm ［1957］; Tye ［1975］; Sellars ［1975］). Furthermore, the adverbial theory also accepts the phenomenal principle（cf. Crane and French ［2015］ sec. 3. 2. 1). However, contrary to the sense-datum theory, it does not accept the existence of inner entities like sense-data. What instantiates the relevant properties in perceptual experience is not a sense-datum – instead, the theory claims that a perceptual experience in which something appears F to the subject is to be understood as a case of sensing F-ly. For instance, when a subject visually perceives something brown, the subject is understood as visually sensing brownly. A property F that something in perceptual experience appears to have, then, is an attribute or modification of the sensing. Furthermore, some *thing* that appears to have the relevant property in perceptual experience is also understood as an attribute or modification of sensing – that is, a perceptual experience in which some thing O appears to the subject also consists in sensing O-ly. For example, a perceptual experience of a flame is sensing *flame*-ly.

　　The key notion of 'sensing' is not identical to perceptual experience itself but explains what perceptual experience is : it is a state that occurs on the side of a subject, rather than a relation between the subject and something like a sense-datum. Hence, according to this theory, what instantiates the relevant properties in perceptual experience is a state of sensing（instead of some kind of object).[5] And therefore, presentational properties of perceptual experience are understood as properties of a state that occurs on the side of the subject. It is in this respect that the adverbial theory differs most significantly from the sense-datum theory : the former denies what the latter affirms, namely, that perceptual experience is a relation between the subject of the experience and its object. This latter idea, I will call the 'relational view' in the following.

　　The Relational View : perceptual experience is a relation between the
　　　　subject of the experience and its object.

The phenomenal principle does not imply the relational view.[6] However, naive realism appears to imply the relational view that applies to veridical

experience. Therefore, the adverbial theory can be seen as implying a more thorough rejection of naive realism than the sense-datum theory, given that the former rejects the relational view while the latter still accepts it.

4. 3 The Intentional Theory

　　Like the previous two theories, the intentional theory accepts the indiscriminability view and the common factor principle and rejects naive realism (cf. Harman [1990] ; Tye [1995] ; Crane [2001] [2006]). According to the intentional theory, a perceptual experience of some ordinary things and their properties in the public, external world is a state of representing those things as having those properties.

　　At a glance, it may seem that the intentional theory accepts both the phenomenal principle and the relational view, but it actually doesn't accept either. Representing something as having some properties doesn't imply that there really is something instantiating those properties, because, according to the intentional theory, a non-veridical experience and a corresponding veridical experience can have exactly the same intentional content. When a subject has a hallucination of an orange flame on their desk, for example, the subject is in a state of non-veridically representing an orange flame, and there doesn't need to be anything instantiating the property of being orange in the external world or in the subject's inner world for the subject to be able to be in that state, just as there doesn't need to be anything instantiating the property of being orange anywhere for the subject to falsely believe that there is an orange flame on their desk. The same can be said about the state of veridically representing (*i.e.* about veridical experience). Intentional properties are the components of intentional contents and are uninstantiated, which means that they are ontologically more similar to abstract objects or universals than to particulars or tropes. According to the intentional theory, the presentational character of perceptual experience is understood just as a collection of intentional objects that don't imply actual existence and intentional properties that don't imply instantiation. Consequently, the intentional theory (implicitly) rejects the phenomenal principle.

　　Furthermore, for a subject to be in a state of representing something, there doesn't need to be anything besides that state of representing itself. In other words, representing is a state that occurs on the side of the subject and not a relation between the subject of the experience and its object. And therefore, the intentional theory (implicitly) rejects the relational view as well.

This theory, then, rejects (even) more aspects or implications of naive realism than the adverbial theory.[7]

4. 4 The Direct Perception Theory

All three theories discussed thus far accept the indiscriminability view and the common factor principle and reject naive realism to resolve the contradiction, but one could also reject the common factor principle, while accepting the indiscriminability view and naive realism. This is the approach of the direct perception theory, which I endorse (cf. Martin [1997] [2002] [2004] [2006]；Fish [2009]). According to this theory, veridical experience consists in acquaintance with ordinary things and their properties in the public, external world. Like the sense-datum theory, the direct perception theory explains the presentation of things and properties in veridical experience by means of the notion of acquaintance, which is a primitive and direct relation between the subject of the experience and its object.

Since the direct perception theory accepts naive realism, it also accepts that the phenomenal principle and the relational view apply to veridical experience. When a subject veridically perceives some ordinary things having some properties in the public, external world, then this means that there really are some things instantiating those properties, and the veridical experience is understood as a relation between the subject and its object. Hence, this theory insists that presentational properties of veridical experience are properties instantiated by ordinary things in the public, external world. However, because the direct perception theory denies the common factor principle, this does not imply that non-veridical experience also consists in acquaintance with ordinary things and their properties in the public, external world.

Non-veridical experience does not share an underlying mental state with veridical experience. This doesn't mean that the two kinds of experience have nothing in common – we can at least say that a non-veridical experience and its corresponding veridical experience have a property of being subjectively indiscriminable from that veridical experience in common, although it is quite trivial to say that something is subjectively indiscriminable from itself. However, this subjective indiscriminability is not due to some shared underlying mental state, and therefore, a common description of the two kinds of experience is fundamentally disjunctive：a subject S has a perceptual experience of X if and only if either S has a veridical experience of X, or S has a non-veridical experience of X. This claim by the direct perception theory

about non-veridical experience is called 'disjunctivism'. Such disjunctivism is a minimal claim, however, because it does not explain *why* a non-veridical experience is indiscriminable from a corresponding veridical experience. One may wonder whether the direct perception theory shouldn't explain subjective indiscriminability if it aims to be a successful philosophical theory. This, indeed, is one of the issues considered in the next section. In anticipation thereof, I want to mention here that a distinction can be made between positive disjunctivism (cf. Fish [2009]) and negative disjunctivism (cf. Martin [2004] [2006]) depending on whether it is attempted to explain why the indiscriminability view holds (by means of some auxiliary hypotheses about non-veridical experience).[8]

5. Assessment of the Philosophical Theories of Perception

　　A central question posed in the introduction of this paper is how we can assess the philosophical theories of perception introduced in the previous section. Is the direct perception theory, which I support, more 'successful' than the other theories? To answer such questions we need to know what methods or criteria for assessment we should use, but also what remaining issues the direct perception theory needs to address. For this reason, the consideration of how to assess these theories and the clarification of the tasks at hand are the main aims of this paper.

5. 1 The Assessment Criteria of Inference to the Best Explanation

　　As mentioned in section 3, the aim and purpose of philosophical theories of perception is to answer the most fundamental question in the philosophy of perception – that is, the question of what perceptual experience is – and to consistently explain relevant aspects of our ordinary conception of perception with the help of some auxiliary hypotheses, while assuming at least some aspects of that ordinary conception. It seems to follow from this purpose that the theory that gives the best explanation is the superior theory. This approach to assessment is associated with the kind of reasoning that is known as 'inference to the best explanation'. It is not immediately obvious, however, what the best explanation is. Generally, inference to the best explanation is considered to involve the following four assessment criteria (cf. Baggini and Fosl [2003]):

　1) Simplicity：when possible, go with the least complicated explanation.

　2）Coherence：when possible, go with the explanation that is consistent with
　　　what we already believe to be true.
　3）Testability：when possible, go with the theory that allows you to make
　　　predictions that can be confirmed or disconfirmed.
　4）Comprehensiveness：when possible, go with the explanation that explains
　　　the most and leaves the least unexplained.

If the purpose of philosophical theories is explanation, and these are the assessment criteria for good explanation, then the philosophical theories of perception should also meet these criteria, which raises the question：Do they actually meet these criteria?

　　The theories introduced above try to consistently explain relevant aspects of the ordinary conception of perception, based on an assumption of some aspects thereof and with the help of some auxiliary hypotheses. The sense-datum theory, the adverbial theory, and the intentional theory all assume the common factor principle and try to explain the indiscriminability view（and other aspects of the ordinary conception）differently, each with the help of different auxiliary hypotheses. The direct perception theory, on the other hand, assumes naive realism and tries to explain other aspects of the ordinary conception（with different auxiliary hypotheses）. Particularly, the direct perception theory is combined with disjunctivism in its approach to explaining non-veridical experience. Disjunctivism, however, comes in two main kinds, as mentioned above：positive disjunctivism tries to explain the indiscriminability view by explaining non-veridical experience, while *negative* disjunctivism considers the indiscriminability view as something primitive that cannot be further explained.

　　Insofar as their explananda are understood as above, all of these theories could be seen as meeting the testability criterion. They all seem to meet the simplicity criterion as well, although there are degrees of complexity, of course. Nevertheless, none of these theories employs excessively complicated tools like the epicycles and equants in the Ptolemaic theory.[9] It is less clear, however, whether these four theories meet the comprehensiveness criterion. Obviously, they all leave some aspect of the ordinary conception of perception unexplained：the common factor principle in case of the direct perception theory, and naive realism in case of the other three. More precisely, all of these theories reject these unexplained aspects as misconceptions. As confirmed above, parts or aspects of the ordinary conception of perception contradict each other, and consequently, if a theory is to meet the coherence criterion, it

needs to reject some part or aspect. With this in mind, it can be said that all of the theories meet both the comprehensiveness and the coherence criteria (at least, insofar possible). Negative disjunctivism might be considered an exception in this respect, however. As mentioned, negative disjunctivism considers the indiscriminability view as something primitive that cannot be further explained. Of course, as a theoretical option primitivity or unexplainability should not be *prima facie* excluded, but it seems indisputable that a theory capable of explaining the indiscriminability view is superior to a theory that can offer no explanation, at least with regards to the comprehensiveness criterion.

5. 2 The 'Depth' of the Two Candidates for Revision

While the sense-datum theory, the adverbial theory, and the intentional theory reject naive realism, the direct perception theory rejects the common factor principle. Because both naive realism and the common factor principle are generally considered to be part of the ordinary conception of perception, to assess these theories, we need to know how central these two aspects of the ordinary conception are. 'Centrality' in this sense is associated with Quine's notion of a 'web of belief' and the dynamics of revision of parts of that web (Quine [1951]).

According to Quine, the closer a belief is located to the center of the web, the less likely it is that that belief is a (suitable) candidate for revision. The reason why beliefs in, or close to the center are less revisable in this sense is that such beliefs are connected to almost everything else in the web, and consequently, that abandoning them would mean abandoning almost the whole web of belief. For this reason, when revisions to the web need to be made, and one has a choice between revising more central or more peripheral beliefs, one should always make revisions as far as possible from the center of the web. The crux of this principle, which could be called 'conservatism' or 'minimal revisionism', is that one should aim to minimize the *global* impact of one's revisions on the web of belief.

Applying this general idea to the present context, we find the worldview that provides the framework for our investigations at the center of the web of beliefs that constitute the ordinary conception of perception. The closer some aspect of the ordinary conception is to that center, the less revisable it is. This raises the question : Which is the more central (and which is the more peripheral) aspect of the ordinary conception, naive realism or the common

factor principle? The aspects of the ordinary conception that are accepted by the various theories move closer to the center after revision – that is, after rejection of either naive realism or the common factor principle – but the question here is whether either revision is acceptable in the first place, and how central or peripheral the revised (*i.e.* rejected) aspects are *before* revision (*i.e.* rejection). Their locations before revision are the locations of these aspects in the ordinary conception that shapes our worldview before philosophical reflection. Hence, a more central aspect is a more fundamental or 'deeper' aspect of our (pre-philosophical) worldview, and for this reason, I will call a more central part or aspect in this sense a 'deeper' part or aspect of the ordinary conception.

The question, then, is：Which is a deeper aspect of the ordinary conception of perception, naive realism or the common factor principle? I think it is naive realism, because it seems to me that naive realism is more influential than the common factor principle in our (pre-philosophical) worldview. And therefore, abandoning the common factor principle doesn't *significantly* change our various understandings and investigations, while abandoning naive realism would lead to *very significant* changes.（And even if abandoning the common factor principle would lead to significant changes, those wouldn't be as far-reaching as the changes in our worldview resulting from a rejection of naive realism.）

A possible objection to this line of reasoning is that sometimes a deeper part or aspect of some ordinary conception needs to be rejected, as was the case with the Ptolemaic theory, for example. However, for such a far-reaching revision to be acceptable, there is a condition that must be met：the revision must also explain why we were holding on to the deeper part or aspect that is being revised or rejected in the first place. For example, the heliocentric theory also explained *why* we believed in the Ptolemaic theory. In view of the dynamics of (the revision of) the web of belief, a significant revision of the framework of investigation itself requires a sufficiently weighty reason. In the present context this means that we need to answer the question whether the theories that reject naive realism can explain why we tend to believe in naive realism in the first place and whether they have a sufficiently weighty reason for its rejection. This is the topic of the next subsection.

5. 3 The Explanatory Tasks of the Philosophical Theories of Perception

To be a successful theory of perception, a theory that rejects naive realism

must explain why we tend to believe that naive realism is true (at least prior to philosophical reflection). In case of the sense-datum theory and the adverbial theory, it seems unlikely, however, that they will be able to carry out this task, because they implicitly reject the 'transparency view'.

> The Transparency View : introspection of perceptual experience reveals that we are at least aware of ordinary things and their properties in the public, external world (i.e. things and properties that exist independently from the experience).[10]

The state of 'awareness' in this view should not be understood as implying a presentation of ordinary things and their properties (to the subject) as assumed by naive realism. However, it seems to me that we should at least accept the transparency view to explain why we believe in, and tend to hold on to naive realism, because this view requires theories to accept that in perceptual experience ordinary things and their properties in the public, external world appear to the subject of that experience. Since the sense-datum theory understands the presentational character of perceptual experience as something occurring in the subject's inner world, and the adverbial theory understands it as something that is intrinsic to the experience (rather than to what is out there), neither theory seems to be able to accept this view.[11]

The intentional theory, on the other hand, may seem to have less difficulty with the transparency view. According to this theory, the presentational character of perceptual experience is a collection of intentional objects and properties that are each represented as ordinary things and their properties in the public, external world. And consequently, it seems likely – at least, at first sight – that the intentional theory can explain why we believe in, and hold on to naive realism. We have been confusing the *appearance* of ordinary things and their properties as intentional objects and intentional properties with their presentation, and it is this confusion which anchored naive realism in the ordinary conception of perception.

There may be a problem with this explanation, however. It implies that we (tend to) confuse intentional properties that aren't instantiated with instantiated properties that are presented in veridical experience. The intentional theory would maintain that intentional properties closely resemble instantiated properties, leading to the confusion, but to see whether the resemblance is as close indeed, we first need to understand what it means for

perceptible properties of ordinary things in the external world to be actually instantiated. However, it isn't entirely clear how to understand the instantiation of perceptible properties of ordinary things in the intentional theory. In case of the direct perception theory, we can understand what the instantiation of perceptible properties of ordinary things is through acquaintance therewith in veridical experience, but in case of the intentional theory, we can only encounter intentional properties that don't imply their instantiation. And for this reason, it seems that we cannot understand what it means for perceptible properties of ordinary things to be instantiated in the intentional theory. But if that is the case, we cannot make sense of the aforementioned resemblance either – if we don't know what exactly it means for perceptible properties to be instantiated, then we also don't know what it means to closely resemble instantiated perceptible properties. Consequently, the intentional theory's explanation of why we believe in, and hold on to naive realism fails.

An adherent of the intentional theory might want to offer the following counterargument, however : 'We cannot be acquainted in veridical experience with instantiations of microphysical properties such as the electric charge of particles, but we can understand what the instantiation of such properties is anyway. In the same way, even though we can only encounter intentional properties that aren't instantiated, we can understand what the instantiation of perceptible properties is anyway.'

This defensive counterargument raises the question why and how we can understand what the instantiation of microphysical properties is. It seems to me that this understanding is possible because these properties are functional properties that can be defined in terms of causal relations that we can understand thanks to our recognition of the occurrence of their causes and effects. The occurrence of some cause/effect pair may be an instantiation of other functional properties, but we can only understand such an instantiation of functional properties if at least some occurrences of similar causes and effects are instantiations of perceptible properties that we understand because we are acquainted with those properties in veridical experience. Hence, it appears that we must be able to be acquainted with perceptible properties of ordinary things in the public, external world, which is denied by the intentional theory.

It follows, then, that not just the sense-datum theory and the adverbial theory, but also the intentional theory is unable (or insufficiently able) to carry out the task required of a successful theory : to explain why we tend to

believe what the theory rejects in the first place. We cannot conclude from this （yet） that the direct perception theory is the most successful philosophical theory of perception, however, because it faces a similar task. At first glance, the common factor principle seems the most natural explanation of the indiscriminability view. Given that the direct perception theory rejects the common factor principle, it must offer another explanation of indiscriminability, even if the common factor principle itself doesn't need to be explained. Towards this end, I think that the direct perception theory should be combined with positive disjunctivism. As explained above, there is a theoretical option of taking the indiscriminability view to be something unexplainable or primitive, as in the negative disjunctivist approach, but following that approach would imply that the direct perception theory is not the most successful theory, because it would be as inferior as its competitors with regards to comprehensiveness. Consequently, the task faced by the direct perception theory is to explain the indiscriminability view, if it is to prevail as the most successful theory. Several attempts have already been made to provide such an explanation （cf. Fish ［2009］; Brewer ［2006］ ［2008］）. Unfortunately the present paper cannot examine those in detail, but I plan to do so in another paper.

6. Conclusion

　　My two aims in this paper were to discuss the methods and criteria for the assessment of philosophical theories of perception, and to clarify what needs to be addressed by the direct perception theory, which I consider the most successful theory in light of those methods and criteria. Because philosophical theories aim for explanation, the theories of perception should meet the assessment criteria of inference to the best explanation: simplicity, coherency, testability, and comprehensiveness. The last of these criteria implies that – because naive realism is a 'deeper' aspect of our ordinary conception of perception – theories that reject naive realism have to explain why we tend to believe in naive realism in the first place. I argued above, however, that none of those theories are successful in this respect. On the other hand, because the common factor principle is a more or less natural explanation for the indiscriminability view （*i.e.* the view that there can be non-veridical experiences that are subjectively indiscriminable from corresponding veridical experiences）, the direct perception theory, which rejects the common factor

principle, needs to provide an alternative explanation of this indiscriminability view（which it does not reject）. Whether it can be considered the most successful philosophical theory of perception depends on whether it can carry out this task.[(12)]

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註

（1）Some philosophers use the term 'naive realism' to refer to the view that not just veridical experience, but all perceptual experience presents ordinary things and their properties in the public, external world to the subject (*e.g.* Fish [2009]). However, I find the implication that we ordinarily understand even non-veridical experience as presenting ordinary things in the external world implausible, and therefore, insofar as I use the term to refer to an aspect of the ordinary conception of perception, I will use the term in the more restricted sense advocated here.

（2）I partially owe the term 'problem of perception' and the problem setting employed here to Crane and French [2015]. However, my view of the ordinary conception of perception differs slightly from theirs. They suggest that – in the ordinary conception of perception – veridical perception of things and their properties does not include actual existence of those things and/or the actual instantiation of those properties, but I disagree with this view and believe that the ordinary conception of perception does have this naive realistic implication. Crane and French's view may be related to the aim of making the intentional theory (see section 4. 3), which is supported by Crane, to be as consistent as possible with the ordinary conception of perception.

（3）Strictly speaking, what is called the 'underlying mental state of a perceptual experience' in these arguments should be understood as the part of the perceptual experience in which the *phenomenal character* of the perceptual experience consists. I will explain more about that character of perceptual experiences in section 3.

（4）It might be argued that the difference in modes of perceptual experiences or sensory modalities such as vision and touch is reflected in the presentational character of them. However, the phenomenal character of perceptual experience seems to be also determined by the mode of experience that is related to the subject's tacit sensorimotor skills (cf. Noë [2004]) and isn't reflected in the presentational character of them.

（5）The adverbial theorists often emphasize that this doesn't mean that a perceptual experience is itself brown when the subject perceive something brown (cf. Crane and French [2015] sec. 3. 2. 1). However, I don't know what it means that the experience itself is not brown, although the experience itself instantiates the property of being brown. It seems necessary, after all, to incorporate some element of the intentional theory into the adverbial theory, in order to make this claim of the adverbial theory understandable. I will introduce the intentional theory in the next subsection.

（6）Unlike the present paper (as well as Crane and French [2015]), Fish [2010] (pp. 36-7) presents the adverbial theory as involving a rejection of the phenomenal principle, which

may be related to Fish's understanding of the state of 'awareness' in the phenomenal principle as a relational state in the sense of the relational view. Hence, it appears that Fish holds that the phenomenal principle implies the relational view. In contrast, I don't consider the state of 'awareness' in the phenomenal principle to be a relational state, and consequently, in my view, the phenomenal principle and the relational view are logically independent from each other.

（7） A possible objection to this claim is that if the intentional content of veridical experience can be understood to be a singular content (in other words, an object's-existence-dependent or property's-instantiation-dependent content), then the intentional theory can accept both the phenomenal principle and the relational view, because a singular content presupposes that the objects represented really exist and that the properties represented are instantiated. This would be a misconception, however – a representational state with a singular content can be false just because it is a representational state. Regardless of the kind or nature of the representation, it is always possible that a represented object doesn't really exist or that a represented property isn't really instantiated (cf. Crane [2006] pp. 135, 138, 140；Fish [2009] pp. 31-2；Crane and French [2015] secs. 3. 3. 3, 3. 4. 1). Hence, the objection fails – the intentional theory rejects both the phenomenal principle and the relational view indeed.

（8） According to Takuya Niikawa, a further distinction can be made between eliminative disjunctivism and non-eliminative disjunctivism depending on whether it is denied or affirmed that hallucinations have presentational character (Niikawa [2019]). The minimal form of disjunctivism introduced here is a view about the phenomenal or presentational character of perceptual experience that the direct perception theory can accept, but there are also kinds of disjunctivism that are incompatible with the direct perception theory. According to disjunctivism about the intentional content of perceptual experience, for example, veridical experiences (and illusions) have a singular content, while hallucinations only have a general content. The direct perception theory cannot accept that kind of disjunctivism because it understands veridical experience as a representational state. Consequently, disjunctivism about intentional content could only be accepted by the intentional theory, which illustrates that it isn't logically impossible for the intentional theory to reject the common factor principle. Furthermore, there is also something called 'epistemological disjunctivism', but that notion occurs in a different context and is of little relevance here. See Fish [2010] and Byrne and Logue [2008] for details of these various kinds of disjunctivism.

（9） It could be argued that the assumption of the existence of sense-data violates Ockham's Razor, however, and therefore, that the sense-datum theory doesn't meet the simplicity criterion. This might indeed be a valid objection to a kind of sense-datum theory that accepts ordinary physical entities in addition to sense-data as basic entities (cf. Jackson [1977]). However, the objection misses its target in case of a sense-datum theory that does not accept ordinary physical entities as basic entities but only as logical constructs of sense-data (cf. Foster [2000]), as such a theory doesn't involve excessively many posits or ontological commitments.

（10） Given this definition, the transparency view doesn't rule out the possibility that introspection reveals that we are also aware of properties of the experience itself, but (a

version of) the transparency view could also be understood as rejecting that possibility. In the present context the 'weak' form of transparency as defined here is sufficient, however, and moreover, there are philosophers who only support such a weak form of the transparency view (*e.g.* Crane [2001] ; Crane and French [2015]).

(11) I think that this refutation of the sense-datum theory and the adverbial theory is by no means exhaustive. It might be objected that both of these theories can incorporate elements of the intentional theory in order to carry out the present explanatory task, independently of the explanation of presentational character of perceptual experience. However, the intentional theorist answer to the present explanatory task faces another problem, as we shall see below, and hence, both of these theories which incorporate elements of the intentional theory will face the same problem after all. Furthermore, it can also be noted here that both theories have different internal problems (see Fish [2010] for details).

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