An Explanation of Hallucination and Illusion by the Direct Perception Theory

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Takeshi Kanasugi

要旨

直接知覚説は、知覚経験に関するわれわれの日常的理解（以下では単に「知覚の日常的理解」と略記する）の一部分である素朴実在論（詳細は以下で説明する）を前提とする知覚の哲学的理論である。本稿の目的は、この直接知覚説が知覚の日常的理解の別の部分である識別不可能性テーゼ（詳細は同じく以下で説明する）の成立を説明できるということを示すことによって、直接知覚説が「最良の説明への推論」の評価基準を最も良く満たす最良の哲学的知覚理論であるということを示すことである。

知覚の哲学的諸理論は、知覚の日常的理解のある側面を前提にして、知覚とは何かという問いに答えることを試みる。知覚経験はそれ固有の現象的性格（すなわち、その経験をすることがどのようなものであるか）を持つと考えられ、その現象的性格はその現前的性格（すなわち、その経験において主体に現前化しているように見える事物や性質の集まり）によって少なくとも大部分は特徴づけられると考えられる。それゆえ、知覚の哲学的諸理論の主たる目的は、知覚経験の現前的性格を説明することであると考えられる。さらに、知覚の哲学的諸理論は補助仮説とともに、知覚の日常的理解の他の部分を整合的に説明することも目指す。

しかし、知覚の日常的理解の諸部分は互いに矛盾しているように思われる。それゆえ、知覚の哲学的諸理論が理論として成功するためには、その日常的理解の何らかの部分を否定しなければならない。互いに矛盾すると考えられる諸部分とは以下の三つである。

素朴実在論：真正な知覚経験（以下ではこれを「真正な知覚」と呼ぶ）とは、公的で外的な世界の日常的な事物やその性質の、知覚主体に対する現前化である。
識別不可能性テーゼ：どの真正な知覚にも、それとは主観的に識別不可能な真正でない知覚経験（以下ではこれを「真正でない知覚」と呼ぶ）が存在しうる。
共通要素原理：主観的に識別不可能な真正な知覚と真正でない知覚は、共通の基礎

的な心的状態を含む。（本稿では、「基礎的な心的状態」という表現で、ある知覚経験の、その現象的性格を含む部分のみを指す。）

錯覚論法および幻覚論法によると、真正でない知覚の場合、主体が仮に、公的で外的な世界に存在する事物や性質を知覚しているようにみえるとしても、それらの事物や性質に対応するものが外的世界に実際に存在するとは言えず、それゆえ、真正でない知覚は、公的で外的な世界の日常的な事物やその性質の現前化として理解することができない。さらに、これらの議論によれば、識別不可能性テーゼにより、どの真正な知覚にも、それとは主観的に識別不可能な真正でない知覚経験が存在しうると考えられ、また共通要素原理により、主観的に識別不可能な真正な知覚と真正でない知覚は、共通の基礎的な心的状態を含むと考えられる以上、真正な知覚についても同じことが言える。これはすなわち、真正な知覚もまた、公的で外的な世界の日常的な事物やその性質の現前化として理解することができないということである。このようにして、素朴実在論は否定される。

知覚の哲学の代表的な理論のうち、センスデータ説、副詞説、志向説はいずれも、共通要素原理を前提して、それぞれ異なる仕方で補助仮説とともに識別不可能性テーゼ（および日常的理解の他の側面）を説明しようとする一方で、矛盾を解消するために素朴実在論を否定する。それに対して、直接知覚説は、素朴実在論を前提して、補助仮説とともに他の側面を説明しようとする一方で、矛盾を解消するために共通要素原理を否定する。これらの理論が、最も成功した理論の座を巡り競合している。

筆者は、Kanasugi［2021］において、哲学的理論が説明を目的とするものである以上、それは最良の説明への推論の評価基準である、単純性、整合性、テスト可能性、包括性の基準を満たすべきであると論じた。また筆者はそこで、上述の知覚の哲学的諸理論が以上の基準のうち包括性を除く三つの基準をある程度は満たしているとも論じた。しかし、そこでは、素朴実在論が知覚の日常的理解の「より深い」部分であり、それゆえ素朴実在論を否定する理論は、われわれがそもそも素朴実在論を信じがちであるのはなぜであるかを説明しなければならないということ、しかし素朴実在論を否定する理論はいずれもその点に成功していないということが確かめられた。他方で、共通要素原理は識別不可能性テーゼの自然な説明であるがゆえに、共通要素原理を否定する直接知覚説は、包括性基準の観点から見て、このテーゼについての代わりの説明を提示する必要がある。つまり、なぜどの真正な知覚にも、それとは主観的に識別不可能な真正でない知覚が存在しうるのかということを、共通要素原理に訴えずに説明することが、直接知覚説が最も成功した理論であるために取り組まなければならない課題なのである。本稿の目的は、直接知覚説がこの課題にうまく答えることができるということを示すことにある。

以上のような本稿での問題設定と本稿の目的を説明するのが、本稿の１節の内容である。以下では、本稿の各節の概要を示そう。

２節ではまず、直接知覚説が、なぜどの真正な知覚にも、それとは主観的に識別

不可能な幻覚が存在しうるのかということを説明できるかどうかを考察する。素朴実在論を支持する直接知覚説は共通要素原理を認めることができない。そのため直接知覚説は、真正な知覚と真正でない知覚に共通する最も根本的な記述は「主体SがXの知覚経験を持つのは、SがXの真正な知覚経験を持つか、SがXの真正でない知覚経験を持つかのいずれかであるとき、かつそのときに限られる」という選言的なものであるとする選言説を採用することになる。選言説にはいくつかの下位分類があるが、包括性基準の観点から筆者が最も有望な選択肢だと考えるのは、W・フィッシュが提唱している幻覚に関する消去的な積極的選言説である。フィッシュのこの選言説によれば、「幻覚は現象的性格および現前的性格を欠くにもかかわらず、薬物や病気、主体の心的資質や学習履歴などのために、対応する真正な知覚と同じ認知的結果（ある知覚経験を持っているという高階の信念や関連する非言語的なふるまい）を持ち、そのため、当の真正な知覚から主観的に識別不可能である」という形で、識別不可能性テーゼの説明を与えることができる。しかし、フィッシュの選言説は、幻覚が現象的性格や現前的性格を一切欠いていると説明するがゆえに、幻覚が「現実感」とでも呼ぶべきものを持つということを十分に説明することができない。

続く３節では、直接知覚説が、なぜどの真正な知覚にも、それとは主観的に識別不可能な錯覚が存在しうるのかということを説明できるかどうかを考察する。ここでも錯覚の識別不可能性を説明する有望な理論として、フィッシュの理論を取り上げる。フィッシュは、錯覚を、物理的錯覚、認知的錯覚、錯視の三種類に分類し、それぞれを説明する。物理的錯覚の典型例は、たとえば、円いコインが斜めから見ると楕円に見えるというような、事物が実際に持つ形や色とは異なる形や色を持つように見える例である。また認知的錯覚の一つの典型例は、主体が道端の縄を蛇と取り違えるという錯覚である。さらに錯視の例の中には、回廊錯視、カニッツァの三角形、ミュラー・リヤー錯視などの錯覚が含まれる。フィッシュによれば、これらの錯覚はすべて、外的世界の事物の何らかの性質については正しく知覚しているという点で真正な知覚の要素を持っているが、知覚的誤りを含むという点で幻覚の要素も持っている。それゆえ、フィッシュは、すべての錯覚の識別不可能性を、幻覚の識別不可能性と同様に、対応する真正な知覚と同じ認知的結果を持つという点によって説明できるように思われる。しかし問題は、幻覚の場合と同様に、フィッシュの説明において錯覚の現実感をどのように理解できるかという点である。もっとも錯覚の場合には、知覚経験の主体に何らかの性質が現前化していると考えられるので、フィッシュは、錯覚の現実感を説明するために、それらの性質の現前化に訴えることができる。しかし、そこで現前化している性質とは厳密に言うと何であるのかという問題が残る。つまり、それは事物の内在的で非関係的な無視点的性質（たとえば、コインを斜めから見ても円く見るというときの「円い」という性質）と、視点や状況に依存する関係的な有視点的性質（たとえば、コインを斜めから見たときに見える「楕円」の形）のどちらなのか、あるいはその両方なのかということである。これらの考察を通して、直接知覚説が幻覚と錯覚を説明するための鍵は、一般に知覚経験おいて厳密にはいかなる種類の性質が主体に現前化しているのかを吟

味することにあるということが明らかになる。

最後の 4 節では、以上の点を吟味し、直接知覚説による幻覚と錯覚の説明可能性について考察する。ここでは、まず無視点的性質と有視点的性質の関係について考察し、実在の世界に存在する無視点的な性質は多面的なものであり、さまざまな側面、すなわち有視点的性質を持つという点、そして、知覚において有視点的な性質が現前化するときにはつねに、その背景として何らかの無視点的性質も現前化するという点を確認する。筆者は、真正な知覚とはこのような多面的な世界の日常的事物やその性質の、知覚経験の主体に対する現前化であると主張する形の直接知覚説を提唱する。真正な知覚の現実感はそれらの有視点的性質や無視点的性質の現前化によって少なくともその大部分は説明されると筆者は考える。4 節ではまた、有視点的性質と無視点的性質の現前化を可能にする条件の一つが、主体の適切な感覚運動的な諸技能であるという点も確認する。その「感覚運動的な諸技能」とは、能動的な運動の結果として有視点的性質がどのように変化するかを暗黙的に理解しているということである。世界は、知覚主体がそのような感覚運動的技能を行使することによって接近可能なものとして知覚に与えられるのである。筆者の考えでは、真正でない知覚では、主体に現前化しているように思われている有視点的性質や無視点的性質のすべて（幻覚の場合）もしくは一部（錯覚の場合）が実際には現前化していないが、その主体は関連する感覚運動的な諸技能を行使している（あるいは、少なくとも行使する態勢にある）がゆえに、真正でない知覚にも、それらの技能に関連する弱い形での現実感があると言える。

以上で確認されるように、直接知覚説は、真正でない知覚に関して、ある補助仮説を採用することによってそれを説明することができる。その補助仮説は、フィッシュの理論に基づきつつ、フィッシュの理論では十分に説明されていない真正でない知覚の現実感と性質の現前化に関して、以上で示されるような説明によって補完されたものである。私は、この形の直接知覚説こそが知覚の理論として最も成功したものであると考える。私はこれを「多面説的直接知覚説」と呼ぶ。

Kanasugi, T.［2021］‘An Assessment of the Philosophical Theories of Perception and the Issues the Direct Perception Theory Needs to Address’, *Kokugakuin Zasshi : the Journal of Kokugakuin University* 122（4）: 1-21.

1. Introduction: Philosophical Theories of Perception and the Task to be Addressed by the Direct Perception Theory

In the philosophy of perception, competing theories aim to explain what perceptual experience is based on assumptions about various parts or aspects of our ordinary conception of perception. It is commonly held that a perceptual experience has a phenomenal character – what it is like to have that experience – and that this phenomenal character is mainly or wholly characterized by the experience's presentational character, or the collection of things and properties that appear to be presented to the subject in the experience. Thus, the main aim of philosophical theories of perception is to explain the presentational character of a perceptual experience based on an assumption about some aspects of our ordinary conception of perception. Additionally, theories of perception attempt to consistently explain other aspects of our ordinary conception with the help of auxiliary hypotheses.(1) However, the various parts or aspects of the ordinary conception of perception may contradict each other; therefore, philosophical theories of perception must reject some of the part(s) or aspect(s) to maintain consistency and be considered successful. The parts or aspects that can be considered mutually contradictory are listed below.

Naive realism: veridical perceptual experience (I will call this "veridical experience" hereafter) is a presentation of ordinary things and their properties in the public, external world to the subject of the experience.

The indiscriminability view: there can be non-veridical perceptual experiences (I will call these "non-veridical experiences" hereafter) that are subjectively indiscriminable from corresponding veridical experiences.

The common factor principle: subjectively indiscriminable veridical and non-veridical experiences involve the same underlying mental state. (The underlying mental state of a perceptual experience is part of the perceptual experience that constitutes its phenomenal character.)(2)

Viewed separately, these three ideas seem intuitively plausible, but philosophical reflection reveals that they contradict each other; therefore, at least one of them must be rejected. There are two famous philosophical arguments that demonstrate this point: the "argument from illusion" and the

“argument from hallucination.” According to these arguments, even though the subject of a non-veridical experience has an experience in which things and their properties appear to be located in the public, external world, it cannot be said that there is anything corresponding (exactly) to those things and properties in the external world. Therefore, a non-veridical experience cannot be understood as a presentation of ordinary things and their properties in the external world to the subject of the experience. This means that the underlying mental state of a non-veridical experience cannot be a presentation of ordinary things and their properties in the external world. Moreover, according to these arguments, the same can be said in the case of a veridical experience because we can assume that there can be non-veridical experiences that are subjectively indiscriminable from corresponding veridical experiences (*i.e.*, the indiscriminability view) and that subjectively indiscriminable veridical and non-veridical experiences involve the same underlying mental state (*i.e.*, the common factor principle). This implies that the underlying mental state of a veridical experience cannot be a presentation of ordinary things and their properties in the external world. That is, a veridical experience cannot be understood as a presentation of ordinary things and their properties in the external world, which implies a rejection of naive realism.

Assuming some aspects of the ordinary conception of perception and aiming for a consistent explanation of other aspects of ordinary conception with the help of auxiliary hypotheses, philosophical theories of perception attempt to resolve the contradiction exposed by these arguments by rejecting one or more of the conflicting aspects of the ordinary conception of perception. The sense-datum theory, the adverbial theory, and the intentional theory all accept the common factor principle and reject naive realism, but they differ in their explanations of the indiscriminability view (and other aspects of ordinary conception) and in the auxiliary hypotheses they employ toward that end. On the other hand, the direct perception theory rejects the common factor principle, accepts naive realism, and makes use of further, differing auxiliary hypotheses to explain other aspects of the ordinary conception of perception.(3) These four theories are the main contenders for the position of the most successful theory in the field.

Elsewhere (Kanasugi [2021]), I have argued that, since philosophical theories aim to provide an explanation, these theories should meet the assessment criteria of inference to the best explanation: simplicity, coherence, testability, and comprehensiveness.

1) Simplicity: when possible, adopt the least complicated explanation.
2) Coherence: when possible, adopt the explanation that is consistent with what we already believe to be true.
3) Testability: when possible, adopt the theory that allows one to make predictions that can be confirmed or disconfirmed.
4) Comprehensiveness: when possible, adopt the explanation that explains the most and leaves the least unexplained.

In the previously mentioned paper, I showed that all these theories, to greater or lesser extent, satisfy the first three of these criteria but that not all of them are equally successful regarding the fourth. I argued that because naive realism is a "deeper" aspect of our ordinary conception of perception, the comprehensiveness criterion implies that theories that reject naive realism must explain why we tend to believe in naive realism in the first place, but none of the theories that reject naive realism are successful in this respect. On the other hand, since the common factor principle is a natural explanation for the indiscriminability view, the direct perception theory (which rejects the common factor principle) must provide an alternative explanation of the indiscriminability view to satisfy the comprehensiveness criterion. Hence, the main task that the direct perception theory must address to be the most successful theory in the field is to explain why and how there can be non-veridical experiences that are subjectively indiscriminable from corresponding veridical experiences without appealing to the common factor principle. My main goals in the present paper are to consider whether the direct perception theory can do this and to present arguments in favor of the view of this theory as the most successful one.

In the philosophy of perception, an explanation of non-veridical experience consists of an explanation of hallucination and illusion, usually starting with the former because illusion has aspects in common with both veridical experience and hallucination and, for that reason, its explanation is assumed to be more complex than that of hallucination. In this study, I adopt the same approach. In Section 2, I will first consider whether the direct perception theory can explain why there can be hallucinations that are subjectively indiscriminable from corresponding veridical experiences. In Section 3, I will consider whether the direct perception theory can explain why there can be illusions that are subjectively indiscriminable from corresponding veridical experiences. Through these examinations, it will become clear that the key to an

explanation of both hallucination and illusion through the direct perception theory is to be found through an examination of the kinds of properties that are presented to the subject in perceptual experiences in general. This examination, as well as an examination of the possibilities of the proposed explanation, are discussed in Section 4.

2. Explanations of Hallucination

As mentioned above, the direct perception theory rejects the common factor principle. Hence, according to this theory, non-veridical experiences that are subjectively indiscriminable from corresponding veridical experiences do not share an underlying mental state with them; consequently, the most fundamental common description of the two kinds of experiences is disjunctive: subject S has a perceptual experience of X if and only if either S has a veridical experience of X or a non-veridical experience of X. This claim about non-veridical experience is called "disjunctivism."

Disjunctivism is a minimal claim regarding non-veridical experience. Elaborations of this minimal claim come in two main types, depending on whether the variety of disjunctivism being discussed attempts to explain why the indiscriminability view holds: *positive disjunctivism*, which attempts to explain this by explaining what non-veridical experiences are, and *negative disjunctivism*, which gives no further description for non-veridical experiences aside from stating that they are subjectively indiscriminable from corresponding veridical experiences, and avoids attempts to explain why the indiscriminability view holds. The starting point of my considerations in this section is the question of which of these two approaches is more appropriate for use as (part of) a philosophical theory of hallucination.

2.1 Positive Disjunctivism and the Local Supervenience Claim

According to the direct perception theory, veridical experience consists in the subject's acquaintance with ordinary things and their properties in the public, external world. The direct perception theory explains the presentation of things and properties in veridical experience by means of the notion of *acquaintance*, which is a primitive and direct relationship between the subject of the experience and its object. One option for employing positive disjunctivism is to explain hallucination as a state that is different from a presentation of ordinary things and their properties in the external world, such

as a state of being presented with sense-data that have specific properties (cf. Austin [1962]; McDowell [1982/1998]) or a state of representing such ordinary things as having such properties. However, employing this option is not without problems.

If the presentational character of a hallucination consists of specific sense-data and their properties – as this option for positive disjunctivism claims – then the presentational character of a corresponding veridical experience seems to consist of the same sense-data and properties. The presentational character of a perceptual experience seems to supervene locally on the brain state of the subject. Furthermore, the presentational character of a veridical experience is considered to have the same supervenience base as that of a corresponding hallucination because it seems that the difference between the experiences depends only on whether the right kind of external cause for the experience exists and not on the difference between proximal causes. Therefore, if the presentational character of a hallucination consists of specific sense-data and their properties, then the same can be said in the case of the presentational character of a corresponding veridical experience. This implies a rejection of the direct perception theory.

However, it is not immediately obvious why local supervenience should hold. Some philosophers have attempted to support local supervenience by appealing to research on neurological disorders or brain damage that aims to reveal the neural correlates of consciousness. However, as Alva Noë and William Fish have argued (Noë [2004] pp. 210-1; Fish [2009] p. 136), all this research shows is that the occurrence of the relevant brain state is a necessary condition for a perceptual experience to have the relevant presentational character while, according to the local supervenience claim, it is a sufficient condition. Fish points out that the brain state could be just one enabling condition (among others) for a perceptual experience to have the relevant presentational character (Fish [2009] p. 137). In other words, it could be just one condition that enables the subject to become acquainted with ordinary things and their properties that exist independently from their experience in the public, external world.(4) If this is correct, a hallucination does not have the same presentational character as a corresponding veridical experience because, in the case of hallucinations, although this enabling condition of veridical experiences holds true, other enabling conditions – such as actual contact with the external world – do not. Even if it is merely a possibility, it cannot be concluded that the supervenience base of the presentational character of a

veridical experience is the same as that of a corresponding hallucination; therefore, the local supervenience claim is not a valid objection to positive disjunctivism.

2.2 The Screening-Off Problem and Negative Disjunctivism

Nevertheless, even though the local supervenience claim must be rejected and the presence of a brain state by itself is not a sufficient condition for a perceptual experience to have the relevant presentational character, the previously mentioned option for adopting positive disjunctivism faces another problem, which is known as the "screening-off problem" (Martin [2004]). It is generally assumed that the presentational character of a perceptual experience explains why the subject of the experience acts in a specific way. For example, the driver of a car puts the brakes on when they veridically see a red light because the red light appears to be presented to them. Someone runs away when experiencing a hallucination of a snake along the roadside (even when there is nothing resembling a snake present) because a snake appears to be presented to that person. According to the direct perception theory, the presentational character of a veridical experience consists of a collection of ordinary things and their properties in the public, external world that are presented to the subject of the experience; therefore, it is the presentations of those things and properties that assume this explanatory role. However, such a presentation of ordinary things and their properties seems to be "screened-off" from the explanation for the following reason.

Even though the presentational character of a veridical experience does not locally supervene on the brain state of the subject, the presentational character of a hallucination does appear to locally supervene on the brain state of the subject, since hallucinations can occur without an external cause (or at least without the *right* kind of external cause, given that a drug or disease that caused the hallucination could also be considered a kind of external cause). Furthermore, given that the difference between a veridical experience and a hallucination does not seem to depend on any difference between their proximal causes, it could be inferred that the same brain state occurs in the subject of the corresponding veridical experience as well. From these premises, it follows that, in addition to ordinary things and their properties, the same sense-data (and their properties) as the ones that are presented to the subject of the hallucination are presented to the subject of the corresponding veridical experience (cf. Robinson [1994] pp. 153-4), which, in turn, suggests that, if the

presentation of these sense-data and properties explains why the subject of the hallucination acts in some way, the same presentation of sense-data and their properties in a corresponding veridical experience plays the same explanatory role in the case of a veridical experience. In other words, the presentation of ordinary things and their properties (in addition to the sense-data) in the veridical experience is explanatorily redundant; consequently, the previously mentioned option for employing positive disjunctivism collapses.

To avoid this screening-off problem of positive disjunctivism, Michael G. F. Martin advocates *negative* disjunctivism (Martin [2004] [2006]). According to negative disjunctivism, all that we can say about a hallucination is that it is subjectively indiscriminable from its corresponding veridical experience even though it is not a veridical experience. Hence, there is no underlying shared state that explains such subjective indiscriminability. The point of the screening-off problem is that, when indiscriminability is explained as consisting in something subjective, it implies that the hallucination and its corresponding veridical experience share that subjective "thing" as their underlying mental state, which contradicts the disjunctivist rejection of a shared underlying mental state. The presentation of ordinary things and their properties, which, according to the direct perception theory, explains why the subject acts in a certain way, is "screened-off" from the explanation. Negative disjunctivism, on the other hand, provides no further explanation for hallucinations other than that they are subjectively indiscriminable from their corresponding veridical experiences; thus, the screening-off problem can be avoided.

A possible objection to the latter claim (*i.e.*, the avoidance of the screening-off problem) is that both a hallucination and its corresponding veridical experience at least share the property of being subjectively indiscriminable from the veridical experience since it is trivially true that a veridical experience is subjectively indiscriminable from itself; consequently, negative disjunctivism also seems to face the screening-off problem. According to Martin, this is a misunderstanding, however, because a hallucination's property of being subjectively indiscriminable from a corresponding veridical experience only has "inherited or dependent explanatory potential" (Martin [2004] p. 70). To explain this property of having "inherited or dependent explanatory potential," Fish introduces the following analogy (Fish [2009] p. 101 [2010] p. 89).

The property of being an unattended bag in an airport will cause a security alert. Sometimes objects with this property are harmless; other times,

they contain a bomb. The question is whether the property of being an unattended bag in an airport, which is shared by harmless and bomb-containing objects, explains why there is a security alert in such a way that the special property of being a bomb in an airport is effectively "screened off." The answer is "no." The shared property of being an unattended bag in an airport has an explanatory role because it bears a relevant relationship to the special property of containing a bomb in an airport. In such cases, we can say that the explanatory potential of the shared property is "inherited from" or "dependent on" the explanatory potential of the special property.

Significantly, the same principle applies to the property of being subjectively indiscriminable from the relevant veridical experience. Regarding the hallucination of a snake mentioned above, if the property of being subjectively indiscriminable from the veridical experience of a snake has a relevant explanatory role, then this is so because it is inherited from (or dependent on) the explanatory potential of the presentational character of the corresponding veridical experience of a snake. Therefore, the presentation of ordinary things and their properties in the veridical experience is not explanatorily redundant; consequently, negative disjunctivism can avoid the screening-off problem.

2.3 The Comprehensiveness Criterion and Fish's Disjunctivist Theory of Hallucination

Despite this situation, it could be argued that a combination of the direct perception theory and negative disjunctivism does not yield a successful philosophical theory of perception because negative disjunctivism gives no further explanation for what hallucinations are other than that they are subjectively indiscriminable from their corresponding veridical experiences, which, consequently, does not explain the indiscriminability view at all. As a theoretical option, inexplicability or primitivity should not be ruled out, but it seems indisputable that a theory capable of explaining the indiscriminability view is superior to a theory that can offer no such explanation, at least regarding the comprehensiveness criterion.(5) For this reason, I will examine another option for adopting positive disjunctivism.

According to Fish ([2009] pp. 94-5 [2010] pp. 105-6), hallucinations lack a phenomenal character (and, therefore, a presentational character as well); nonetheless, a hallucination is subjectively indiscriminable from a corresponding veridical experience because hallucinations have the same

cognitive effects as veridical experiences due to the effect of drugs, diseases, the subject's mental makeup and learning history, and/or other factors.(6) The subject of a hallucination of a snake, for example, has a perceptual belief that there is a snake along the roadside and (simultaneously) a higher-order belief that they are having a veridical experience of the snake; therefore, the subject cannot distinguish between the hallucination and a veridical experience. Furthermore, Fish not only includes the subject's perceptual beliefs and higher-order beliefs about their own perceptual experiences in the group of cognitive effects that a hallucination and corresponding veridical experience have in common but also includes the subject's nonverbal behavior. According to Fish, in the case of conceptually unsophisticated animals, that a hallucination and corresponding veridical experience are associated with the same nonverbal behavior is sufficient for them to be subjectively indiscriminable.(7)

Fish characterizes his own disjunctivism as a version of negative disjunctivism (Fish [2010] p. 103), perhaps because he denies that hallucinations have a phenomenal character. However, it seems more appropriate to classify his disjunctivism as a version of positive disjunctivism, because he offers an explanation of what hallucinations are other than that they are subjectively indiscriminable from their corresponding veridical experiences, and therefore, he attempts to explain why the indiscriminability view holds. (Fish's disjunctivism is more accurately described as "eliminative disjunctivism," but the qualifications "eliminative" and "positive" are not mutually incompatible.) Consequently, Fish's disjunctivism satisfies the comprehensiveness criterion. Nevertheless, if Fish's disjunctivism is a version of positive disjunctivism, then the question of whether it can avoid the screening-off problem must be raised. According to Takuya Niikawa, it can avoid that problem, because it holds that hallucinations have no presentational character, and consequently, there does not appear to be anything that can screen off the presentation of ordinary things and their properties in the corresponding veridical experiences from assuming the relevant explanatory role (Niikawa [2017] pp. 356-7).

2.4 The Felt Reality of Hallucinations

In the foregoing, I argue that Fish's disjunctivism can satisfy the comprehensive criterion and avoid the screening-off problem. For this reason, I believe that Fish's explanation of hallucination is mostly correct. Nevertheless, Fish's disjunctivism may face another explanatory problem. I believe that

hallucinations have something that could be called a “felt reality.” The reason that hallucinations are subjectively indiscriminable from their corresponding veridical experiences might be that hallucinations have such a felt reality. Fish agrees that hallucinations have their own felt reality but does not clarify at all how this can occur despite their lack of phenomenal and presentational character. According to Fish, the subject of a hallucination does not only have a perceptual belief – for example, that there is a snake along the roadside – they also have a higher-order belief that they are having a veridical experience. Fish insists that this kind of higher-order belief explains how hallucinations give the impression of a felt reality by making the subject believe that the experience has a phenomenal and presentational character despite lacking such qualities (Fish [2009] pp. 97-9).

In response to the latter point, Niikawa argues that Fish only accounts for the genesis of felt reality and does not specify the ontological status thereof – that is, whether the relevant felt reality is a feature of the hallucination itself or of a relevant higher-order belief that is a cognitive effect of the hallucination (Niikawa [2019] Sec. 4). However, the first of these options does not seem to be available to Fish because he denies that hallucinations have phenomenal and presentational character, and he would be unable to (consistently) claim that felt reality is a feature of the hallucinations themselves. Therefore, Fish would have to adopt the second option, namely, that felt reality is a feature of the relevant higher-order belief. I question, however, whether this is a plausible idea because felt reality seems to be more phenomenal in nature. Simply believing that the earth is round without having any mental images does not seem to involve any felt reality, for example. Based on this consideration, one might ask why simply having a higher-order belief about one’s own veridical experience involves a felt reality. In Section 4, I will return to discussion of this problem along with some problems involved in the disjunctivist explanation of illusion.

3. Explanations of Illusion

As mentioned before, illusion shares certain aspects with both hallucination and veridical experience. As a result, disjunctivist explanations of illusion are often separated into two kinds, depending on whether they approach illusions (more) like hallucinations (V *vs.* IH disjunctivism) or (more) like veridical experiences (VI *vs.* H disjunctivism) (Byrne and Logue [2008]; cf. Fish

[2009] [2010]). However, neither of these approaches seems plausible. Fish [2009] [2010] describes various difficulties involved in both approaches,(8) but I believe that the root of those difficulties lies in the fact that illusion shares aspects with both hallucination and veridical experience, and cannot, therefore, be reduced to just one of the two. Instead, we should adopt an approach that aims to explain illusion as having elements of both. In this section, I will examine Fish's disjunctivist theory of illusion, which presently seems to be the most successful theory in this area.

3.1 Fish's Disjunctivist Theory of Illusion

Fish divides illusions into three types: physical, cognitive, and optical illusions (Fish [2009] Ch. 5). He characterizes these types by means of two dimensions: firstly, the importance of the way things are in the external world in terms of their effect on a subject's susceptibility to illusion, and, secondly, the extent to which the way how someone responds to information from the external world can lead to an experience of illusion (Fish [2009] p. 149). In the following three subsections, I will discuss the three types of illusion.

3.1.1 Physical Illusions

Some typical examples of physical illusions are discrepancies between how a thing's shape or color looks to someone and what shape or color really is. For example, a circular coin can appear elliptical when viewed obliquely, and a yellow sweater can appear orange under some lighting conditions. It seems that such physical illusions have a presentational character corresponding to a shape or color that differs from the presentational character of the hypothetical veridical experience – that is, the experience in which a circular coin appears circular and a yellow sweater appears yellow – but none of the properties of the thing have changed. This raises the question of what the presentational character of these physical illusions is. One possible answer to this question is that physical illusions lack presentational character like hallucinations (or have the same presentational character as veridical experiences) and that, in physical illusions, we are only having a false perceptual belief (for example, that the sweater is orange) and a false higher-order belief (for example, that we are veridically perceiving the color of the sweater).

Fish, however, adopts a relational view of properties and presents an alternative account of physical illusions (Fish [2009] pp. 153-4, 159-60). According to this relational view, things can have both intrinsic, nonrelational

properties and relational properties. Relational properties depend both on the way things intrinsically are and on the perspectival situations in which they are perceived, while intrinsic, nonrelational properties do not depend on any such perspectival situations. The mass of a physical object is an example of an intrinsic, nonrelational property; for an object to have a specific mass, it does not need to be in a perspectival situation. Any physical object with a mass will also have a weight within a gravitational field, but its weight depends on its spatial position relative to other masses, among other factors, and it is thus an example of a relational property. Color and shade are analogous to the mass and weight of an object, respectively. An object has a color regardless of the perspectival situation in which it is, but in any specific perspectival situation, a colored object will exhibit a specific shade. Fish mentions that such relational properties are called "perspectival properties (or P-properties)" by Noë (Fish [2009] p. 160). According to Noë,

> P-properties depend on relations between the perceiver's body and the perceived object (and also on conditions of illumination). P-properties are, in effect, relations between objects and their environment. That a plate has a given P-shape is a fact about the plate's shape, one determined by the plate's relation to the location of a perceiver, and to the ambient light. (Noë [2004] p. 83)

Furthermore, Noë claims that "P-properties ... are perfectly 'real' or 'objective'" (Noë [2004] p. 83). Based on this naive, realistic explanation of relational or perspectival properties, Fish argues for a direct perception theorist's explanation of physical illusion according to which a physical illusion has a presentational character that corresponds to the relational or perspectival properties of the object of the subject's illusion. As in veridical experiences, in physical illusions, the real properties (of a certain kind) of ordinary things are presented to the subject of the experience. According to Fish, this explanation ultimately treats a physical illusion as a special case of veridical experience (Fish [2009] p. 151). Noë's explicit reference to a perceiver in the explanation of P-properties may seem to make them too subject-dependent to fit into the direct perception theory, but Fish suggests that

> [Noë's] assertion that P-properties are relations between objects and their environment may suggest a reading more in line with Gibson's. According

> to this reading, an object presents a different P-shape to each different station-point in surrounding space... And while such a station-point would be possible location of an observer, an observer need not actually be situated at that point in order to talk about the P-shape the object presents to that point. (Fish [2009] p. 160)

To avoid any suggestion of subject-dependency (and with the objectivity of perspectives in mind), I will hereafter use the term "perspectival properties" instead of "relational properties"; similarly, I will use "aperspectival properties" instead of "intrinsic, nonrelational properties."

3.1.2 Cognitive Illusions

In one common example of a cognitive illusion, the subject mistakes a coil of rope along the side of the road for a snake. The subject must grasp the concept of a snake to be able to mistake the rope for a snake, and, according to Fish, such a conceptual-recognitional capacity is passively and erroneously exercised in a cognitive illusion based on two things: the nature and layout of the environment the subject is facing (*e.g.*, the existence of the rope) and the subject's mental makeup and learning history (*e.g.*, the subject's phobia of snakes and heightened state of anxiety). Fish maintains that cognitive illusions occur because this conceptual-recognitional capacity is falsely exercised, leading the subject to form an erroneous perceptual belief (*i.e.*, that there is a snake along the roadside) and an erroneous higher-order belief (*i.e.*, that they are veridically perceiving a snake) (Fish [2009] pp. 165-9).

Cognitive illusions and hallucinations are similar in terms of having the same cognitive effects as their corresponding veridical experiences, but according to Fish, there are two important differences between the two. Firstly, even when experiencing a cognitive illusion, the subject veridically perceives some of the properties of things in the external world. For example, the subject of the snake illusion is veridically perceiving that the object is brown, coiled, and so forth (Fish [2009] p. 167); thus, this cognitive illusion has a phenomenal and presentational character corresponding to those properties, while there may be other properties to which the phenomenal and presentational character does not correspond. Secondly, even though the subject's mental makeup and learning history play a role in both perceptual errors (*i.e.*, in cognitive illusions) and hallucinations, in the case of cognitive illusions (but not hallucinations), the nature and layout of the environment the

subject is facing is just as important. The lesser the role and influence of the environment, the more inclined one is to classify a situation as a case of hallucination (Fish [2009] pp. 170-1).

3.1.3 Optical Illusions

Examples of optical illusions include the hallway illusion, Kanizsa triangle, and Müller-Lyer illusion. According to Fish, optical illusions are similar to both previously mentioned types of illusions (Fish [2009] pp. 172-5). Both optical and physical illusions are intersubjective and predictable, and both depend for their occurrence on the world being in a specific way. Nevertheless, the specific way the world needs to be in for a specific kind of optical illusion to occur cannot completely account for the occurrence of optical illusions. In the case of the Müller-Lyer illusion, for example, even though differently oriented arrowheads make lines seem to be of different lengths, the sizes of the retinal images produced by the horizontal components of the two arrows are the same. Fish's explanation is that optical illusions occur because the relevant features of the perceived scene function in such a way that they trick or mislead our perceptual mechanisms.

The similarity with cognitive illusions lies in the fact that optical illusions also depend on what is going on in the subject. According to Fish, optical illusions occur because, similar to cognitive illusions, the subject has an erroneous perceptual belief (for example, that two lines are of different lengths) and an erroneous higher-order belief (for example, that they are veridically perceiving that the two lines have different lengths). However, he insists that there is a critical difference between optical and cognitive illusions. In the case of cognitive illusions, we would expect that if the subject knew, for example, that the object along the roadside was not a snake but a coil of rope, then they would neither believe that the object was a snake nor have the illusion that it was; however, in the case of optical illusions, even if the subject knows, for example, that the lines in the Müller-Lyer illusion are of the same length and thus do not form the relevant erroneous perceptual belief, this knowledge does not stop the illusion from occurring – the two lines continue to look as if they have different lengths. Moreover (or perhaps because of this), optical illusions are more intersubjective and predictable than cognitive ones. Fish notes that this fact suggests that the relevant features of the perceived scene that induce optical illusions "act at a fairly low level" (Fish [2009] p. 176).

3.1.4 The Subjective Indiscriminability of Illusions

According to Fish, all illusions are located on a spectrum between the two extremes of perfect veridical experience and pure hallucination. This alone does not explain why the indiscriminability view holds for illusions, nor is the latter explained explicitly by Fish [2009] [2010], but it seems that an explanation can be constructed relatively easily on the basis of Fish's account of illusion, given that, according to Fish, all illusions have elements of hallucination and veridical experience. That is, the indiscriminability of illusions can be explained in the same way as that of hallucinations by referring to the indistinguishability of their cognitive effects from those of the corresponding veridical experiences.

Nevertheless, there are a few points that require clarification. Fish argues that both cognitive and optical illusions can occur because the subject forms a false perceptual belief and a false higher-order belief about their own perceptual experience. However, given that the relevant features of the perceived scenes that induce optical illusions are believed to act at a fairly low level (as mentioned above), the key to indiscriminability, especially in the case of optical illusions, seems to be that an illusion and its corresponding veridical experience are associated with the same nonverbal behaviors (or behavioral dispositions) that are produced by cognitive processes at such a low level.

Moreover, given that Fish treats physical illusion as a special case of veridical experience, it is not clear from what corresponding veridical experiences the relevant physical illusions are subjectively indiscriminable. Fish suggests, for example, that if the shade something appears to have under unusual lighting conditions falls outside the spectral band that corresponds to a color (as an aperspectival property), then we can say that the subject is misperceiving it (Fish [2009] p. 158); however, it seems to me that we can only make the latter judgment when the subject (probably conceptually) falsely categorizes the shade as one of a different color (*i.e.*, a color besides the one of which it really is a shade) – for example, when a subject falsely categorizes a shade of yellow as a shade of orange. Presumably, this kind of categorization of perspectival properties reflects the same cognitive process that veridically categorizes a shade as belonging to the right color in cases of veridical experience, and it is such veridical experience from which physical illusions are subjectively indiscriminable. I believe that such categorizations of perspectival properties are cognitive processes occurring at a fairly low level and that optical illusions also occur because of such categorizations, while Fish

［2009］［2010］does not raise this issue of categorization.

3.2 The Felt Reality of Illusions

While I believe that Fish's explanation of illusion is mostly accurate, questions about how we can understand the felt reality of illusions in his explanation remain. (This is not mentioned in Fish［2009］［2010］.) Illusions have a felt reality like hallucinations, but, in the case of illusions, there is no need to appeal to a belief that is a cognitive effect (of the illusion) to explain the felt reality (unlike in the case of hallucinations) because some properties are presented to the subject of the experience. For example, some shade of a color appears to the subject in a physical color illusion (as in the previously mentioned case of perceiving a yellow sweater as orange). An explanation of this example available to Fish is that the felt reality of this illusion consists of the presentations of perspectival properties as being this shade. However, I wonder whether the felt reality of this illusion includes just those presentations. Consider again the case of a yellow sweater appearing orange under some lighting conditions. While the perspectival property of having an orange shade is presented to the subject and the felt reality of this illusion includes at least the presentations of such perspectival properties, it seems to me that the aperspectival property of being yellow is also presented to the subject and that the felt reality of this illusion *also* includes the presentations of such aperspectival properties.

Considering that, according to Fish, both cognitive and optical illusions occur because the subject forms a false perceptual belief and a false higher-order belief about their own perceptual experience, their felt reality could be explained by appealing to the false beliefs similarly to the explanation of hallucination. Such an explanation would face the same explanatory problem about felt reality as Fish's disjunctivist explanation of hallucination discussed in Subsection 2.4. However, it seems that at least some perspectival properties are presented to the subject in the case of cognitive and optical illusions as well. Therefore, an alternative explanation available to Fish would be that the felt reality of these illusions also includes the presentation of some perspectival properties. Nevertheless, the question of whether the felt reality of these illusions also includes presentations of aperspectival properties remains. Moreover, the question regarding whether aperspectival properties are presented to the subject is inevitably raised when explaining veridical experiences because they also have a felt reality; therefore, a successful

philosophical theory of perception must explain whether *that* felt reality includes presentations of aperspectival properties. Hence, it turns out that the question that the direct perception theory must answer is what kinds of properties are presented in perceptual experiences in general.(9) In the next section, I address this topic.

4. The Multi-Aspectistic Direct Perception Theory

What properties are presented to the subject in perceptual experiences? In this section, I will investigate whether, in addition to perspectival properties, aperspectival properties are presented to the subject in perceptual experiences. However, before we can proceed with that investigation, we must examine the relationship between aperspectival and perspectival properties.

4.1 Perspectival Properties and Multi-Aspectistic Realism

To examine the relationship between aperspectival and perspectival properties, we must first consider what it means for a thing to have an aperspectival property. For example, we might consider the aperspectival property of being circular. For something to be circular *means* that its apparent shape varies in a specific way depending on the angle at which it is viewed. It only looks circular when viewed from a specific angle (*i.e.*, 90 degrees relative to the two-dimensional plane of the circle) and is elliptical when viewed from any other one. Indeed, in some sense, a circular object still appears circular from any point of view unless its aperspectival shape changes. Nevertheless, it is undeniable that, in another sense, its apparent shape varies in a specific way when viewed from various points of view, and these apparently different shapes are just some examples of perspectival properties. What this seems to imply is that what it means to have an aperspectival property is *exactly* to have various perspectival properties that depend in specific ways on the viewpoints from which the object is being perceived. Thus, for something to be yellow is just for it to have a yellow shade under some lighting conditions, to have an orange shade under others, and so on.

An apparent implication thereof is that when we perceive various perspectival properties, we cannot perceive the corresponding aperspectival property as a whole at once because we cannot perceive the corresponding aperspectival property in all its apparent (perspectival) aspects or facets at once; this might seem to suggest, in turn, that, strictly speaking, in veridical

experiences we only perceive perspectival properties (and not aperspectival properties); in other words, only perspectival properties are presented to the subject and aperspectival properties are not presented. This apparent implication does not hold, however, because perspectival properties are not independent elementary entities, such as sense-data. Perspectival properties exist only as aspects or facets of aperspectival properties; they are ontologically dependent on the latter and cannot exist without them. Hence, something circular does not look elliptical *simpliciter* when viewed obliquely but rather looks just like the apparent shape that a circular object has when viewed from that angle; that is, it looks *perspectivally-elliptical*. Therefore, whenever we perceive a perspectival property, we *also* perceive some aperspectival property in its background. (By implication, an aperspectival property is not merely the sum of various perspectival properties.)

Furthermore, in such a relationship between perspectival properties and some aperspectival property in their background, the perspectival properties are mutually related to each other through expectations. Something circular that has some specific perspectivally-elliptical shape when viewed from a specific viewpoint, for example, is expected to have another specific perspectivally-elliptical shape when viewed from another viewpoint and vice versa. This mutual relationship of expectation cannot be understood separately from the ability to become acquainted with various perspectival properties by moving between various viewpoints.

Regarding the relationship between aperspectival and perspectival properties, Noë writes that

> When I look at my wall, now I see its uniform color in the variations of its apparent color across the surface. In so far as I see the constancy in the variation, I see them both at once. (Noë [2006] p. 419)
> We see [a circular plate's] circularity in the fact that it looks elliptical from here. We can do this because we understand, implicitly, that circularity is given in the way *how things look with respect to shape* varies as a result of movement. (Noë [2004] p. 84)

Noë calls the implicit understanding that makes the perception of aperspectival properties possible "sensorimotor skill" (Noë [2004] p. 84). According to Noë, possessing a sensorimotor skill of some kind is to have a tacit understanding of how perspectival properties change as a result of active movement, and the

world is *available* for perception by the perceiver's exercise of such sensorimotor skills (Noë [2004] p. 77 [2006] pp. 422-3).[10]

It is my view that aperspectival properties and the real world, which has them as one of its components, are multifaceted and consist of various aspects. This view of properties and the real world could be called "multi-aspectistic realism." In this paper, I advocate a version of the direct perception theory that claims that veridical experience is a presentation of ordinary things and their properties in the multifaceted world to the subject of the experience. As argued above, whenever we perceive a perspectival property, we also perceive some aperspectival property in its background. This means that both aperspectival properties in the external world and the perspectival properties that are aspects of such aperspectival properties are presented to the subject in veridical experiences. I will call this version of the direct perception theory the "multi-aspectistic direct perception theory."

4.2 Sensorimotor Skills and the Felt Reality of Non-Veridical Experiences

In this, the final subsection, I discuss what can be said about the felt reality of illusions and hallucinations based on the multi-aspectistic direct perception theory, but there are a few points about sensorimotor skills that require clarification.

Firstly, as mentioned above, according to the multi-aspectistic direct perception theory, not just perspectival properties, but also aperspectival ones, are presented to the subject in veridical experiences. More precisely, perspectival properties are presented as aspects or facets of some aperspectival property, and aperspectival properties are presented as the background of various perspectival properties. For both perspectival and aperspectival properties to be presented in this way, the subject must perceive the object from an appropriate spatial point of view and in appropriate conditions, like specific lighting conditions. In other words, taking a specific spatial point of view and being in specific conditions is a necessary condition for enabling the subject to become acquainted with such properties. However, this is just one enabling condition, and it is not a sufficient condition for the subject to become acquainted with such properties, given that the subject must also possess and exercise the appropriate sensorimotor skills. Neither perspectival properties (as aspects of some aperspectival property) nor aperspectival properties (as the background of various perspectival properties) can be presented to a subject without the subject's exercise of the appropriate sensorimotor skills. Moreover,

because possessing and exercising the appropriate sensorimotor skills is also a condition that enables a subject to become acquainted with such properties, in this broad sense, possessing and exercising such sensorimotor skills partly constitutes taking the appropriate *points of view*, which is necessary for the subject to become acquainted with such properties.

Secondly, as explained above, physical and optical illusions occur due to a false categorization by the subject (in processes at a fairly low level) of a perspectival property as an aspect of some aperspectival property other than the aperspectival property of which it is an aspect. It seems to me that such categorization takes place in all veridical *and* non-veridical experiences, including cognitive illusions and hallucinations, in which some aperspectival property at least *appears* to be presented to the subject. This does not mean that the aperspectival property is being presented to the subject in hallucinations, but it seems indisputable that a specific color and shape *appear* to be presented to the subject of a hallucinatory experience of an orange flame on their desk, for example. The exercise of appropriate abilities of categorization could be considered an enabling condition for the presentation of aperspectival properties; considering that – as mentioned above – exercising appropriate sensorimotor skills is also an enabling condition for the presentation of both perspectival and aperspectival properties, it appears that the relevant sensorimotor skills are closely related to the relevant abilities of categorization and are exercised (or poised to be exercised, at least) in all veridical and non-veridical experiences in which some aperspectival property appears to be presented to the subject. Furthermore, in Subsection 2.3, we examined how a brain state, which is often supposed to be the supervenience base of the presentational character of a perceptual experience, can be one condition (among others) that enables the perceptual experience to have the relevant presentational character. Given that exercising appropriate sensorimotor skills is also considered an enabling condition for a perceptual experience to have the relevant presentational character, it could be argued that the exercise of such sensorimotor skills is at least partly realized by such a brain state.

Having gone over these points, we can now turn to the topic of the felt reality of perceptual experiences. The felt reality of a veridical experience seems to be explained by its phenomenal character, and because the phenomenal character of a veridical experience is at least partly explained by its presentational character, the multi-aspectistic direct perception theory

maintains that the felt reality of a veridical experience is at least partly explained by presentations of perspectival and aperspectival properties in a veridical experience. How can the felt reality of illusions and hallucinations be explained based on this theory, though ?

In the case of hallucinations, it seems that neither perspectival nor aperspectival properties are presented to the subject since there is nothing that instantiates such properties in either the public, external world or in the subject's inner world. However, contrary to Fish's claim, this does not mean that hallucinations do not have a phenomenal character at all, as presentational character is only one determinant of phenomenal character. As seen above, a subject undergoing a hallucinatory experience is considered to be exercising (or at least poised to exercise) the relevant sensorimotor skills, given that some aperspectival property at least *appears* to be presented to the subject, even in a hallucination. Furthermore, as we have also seen, although exercising such skills is not a sufficient condition for the presentation of aperspectival and perspectival properties to the subject, it is a condition that *enables* the presentation thereof. Thus, it seems that the perceptual experiences of a subject who is exercising these skills have at least some *phenomenal* character, even if only in a somewhat weakened form. For this reason, I contend that hallucinations have some phenomenal character, although they do not have a *presentational* character[(11)]; therefore, the felt reality of hallucinations can be explained by their phenomenal character. A possible objection to this claim might be that such a weakened form of phenomenal character enabled by the exercise of a subject's sensorimotor skills (or by being poised to exercise such skills) is insufficient to explain the richness of the felt reality of hallucinations, but whether there actually are hallucinations with such a rich felt reality is debatable,[(12)] and, although it might be claimed that such hallucinations *can* exist, the burden of proof rests with the person making such a claim.

In Subsection 3.2, I argued that the felt reality of illusions can be explained, at least partially, by appealing to the presentation of some perspectival properties to the subject of an illusion. An important question asked near the end of that section is whether the felt reality of illusions also includes presentations of aperspectival properties. Based on the foregoing, we can now answer this question affirmatively. The felt reality of illusions includes presentations of aperspectival properties as well because aperspectival properties are presented to the subject as the background of various perspectival properties in any perceptual experience. The felt reality of

cognitive illusions also includes such presentations of aperspectival properties. In the previously used example of the illusion of a snake, aperspectival properties, such as being brown, are included in the felt reality of the illusion. However, this does not mean that the felt reality of an illusion includes the aperspectival properties in the background of falsely categorized perspectival properties in physical and optical illusions because such aperspectival properties are not presented to the subject in those illusions. Furthermore, like the subject of a hallucination, the subject of an illusion must also exercise the relevant sensorimotor skills because exercising them is an enabling condition for the presentation of both perspectival and aperspectival properties to the subject. Therefore, the illusory experiences of a subject who is exercising these skills have a type of phenomenal character that is weakened in a way related to these skills, and this implies that the felt reality of illusions can also be explained by appealing to this weakened phenomenal character. (Additionally, the subject of a veridical experience also has the relevant sensorimotor skills; consequently, the felt reality of veridical experiences also seems to include such a phenomenal character.)

5. Conclusion

My main aims in this paper were to consider whether the direct perception theory could explain why the indiscriminability view holds and to present arguments in favor of viewing this theory as the most successful theory of perception. As seen above, the direct perception theory can explain the indiscriminability view by adopting an auxiliary theory of non-veridical experience based on Fish's theory, which is complemented by an explanation of the felt reality of non-veridical experiences and of the presentation of properties that were insufficiently explained by Fish [2009] [2010]. Thus, I believe that this version of the direct perception theory, which I call the "multi-aspectistic direct perception theory," is the most successful theory of perception.(13)

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註

(1) Psychology as an empirical science is not irrelevant to the philosophy of perception, because our ordinary conception of perception includes parts or aspects that are shaped by the penetration of the findings of empirical science into the ordinary conception. However, this does not negate the fact that answering the question of what perception is and explaining the various parts and aspects of the ordinary conception of perception is a task proper to the philosophy of perception.

(2) The naming of these parts or aspects follows conventions in the literature of the philosophy of perception, and the differences in the form of naming such as "-ism," "view," and "principle" do not represent differences in the position of these parts in our ordinary conception of perception.

(3) It is important to note that naive realism understands veridical experience as a presentation of ordinary things and their properties, not as a re-presentation of those things and properties, because the direct perception theory, which accepts naive realism, and the intentional theory, which rejects it, are the two most promising theories in recent philosophy of perception and are precisely in conflict over which understanding of veridical experience is correct. Fish [2010] contrasts the intentional theory and the direct perception theory in terms of whether or not they accept the representational principle, which understands all perceptual experiences as representations. While the representational principle may be considered a part or an aspect of our ordinary

conception of perception, I believe that the representational principle has undergone more philosophical theorizing than other parts of the ordinary conception, such as naive realism, the indiscriminability view, and the common factor principle.

（4）Fish mentions Gibson's notion of "resonating to information" as being relevant to this idea (Fish [2009] p. 138; cf. Gibson [1966]).

（5）Even though negative disjunctivism gives no explanation for why the indiscriminability view holds, various versions of negative disjunctivism can appear depending on how the property of being subjectively indiscriminable is defined, and there are other objections to Martin's version of negative disjunctivism specifically. According to Martin, a non-veridical experience of X is subjectively indiscriminable from a corresponding veridical experience of X if and only if it is not possible to know through reflection that it is not a veridical experience of X (Martin [2006] p. 363). Criticism has been leveled against the "through reflection" restriction and the modal characterization expressed as "not possible to know." For example, Scott Sturgeon argues that the "through reflection" restriction can do without ruling out cases in which the subject can infer that they are having a non-veridical experience from the testimony of others, but it cannot do without ruling out cases in which the subject can infer that they are having a non-veridical experience based on their own background beliefs (Sturgeon [2006]). According to Susanna Siegel, the modal characterization "not possible to know" cannot account for non-veridical experiences in creatures, such as dogs, that lack sufficient cognitive sophistication and thus the ability to make judgments of indiscriminability (Siegel [2008]). Although these are interesting arguments (see Fish [2009] Sec. 4.2 for details), I will not address them in this paper because I believe that the most important objection is the one concerned with the comprehensiveness criterion.

（6）Strictly speaking, Fish puts some restrictions on situations in which indiscriminability holds. Firstly, he supposes that a hallucination and corresponding veridical experience that share the same cognitive effects have the same doxastic setting, such as background beliefs and desires. Secondly, he supposes that the subject of a veridical experience is a rational one. According to Fish, the first restriction helps this version of disjunctivism avoid the criticism faced by Martin's version regarding the "through reflection" restriction mentioned in the previous note (see Fish [2009] Sec. 4.7 for details).

（7）According to Fish, this point helps his version of disjunctivism avoid the criticism faced by Martin's version regarding the modal characterization "not possible to know," which is mentioned in Note 5 (see Fish [2009] Sec. 4.5 for details).

（8）In cases of V *vs.* IH disjunctivism, the following objection has been raised, for example. If illusions are to be treated as being like hallucinations, then we must accept that we are not in direct contact with the external world at all when experiencing illusions. However, even as we experience an illusion concerning some properties (*e.g.*, the color) of things, we are usually considered to be veridically perceiving their other properties (*e.g.*, the shape); therefore, a direct perception theorist must accept that we are partly in direct contact with the external world (cf. Fish [2009] p. 44 [2010] p. 104). An example of an objection to VI *vs.* H disjunctivism is that if illusions are to be treated as being like veridical experiences, then there is no point in adopting disjunctivism to avoid the argument from illusion (cf. Fish [2009] p. 45 [2010] p. 105).

(9) To understand what perceptual experience is, we must consider whether *things* are being presented to the subject in perceptual experiences as well. However, answering that question requires more space than is available here because it depends on several complicated philosophical questions, such as the question of what a thing (or substance) is and what the relationship between a thing (or substance) and a property is. Because the question of what kinds of *properties* are presented to the subject in perceptual experiences seems to be more integral to the explanation of the felt reality of perceptual experiences, I will focus my attention on this question here.

(10) These views on the relationship between aperspectival and perspectival properties are based on the ideas of phenomenology.

(11) To be more precise, we could say that, in some sense, some properties are presented to the subject in some *bodily sense experiences* correspondingly to the exercise of (or being poised to exercise) the relevant sensorimotor skills during the relevant perceptual experience (*e.g.*, visual experience), but such properties are not included in the presentational character that corresponds to the content – not meaning the *intentional* content – of the relevant experience itself.

(12) Experiences in dreams and experiences of mental images also seem to only have phenomenal character in this relatively weak form.

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